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International Migration and the European Union Relations in the 
Context of a Comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
Countries: Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
Armando ALIU
†
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates migration flows from Western Balkans and North African countries to 
the high-income countries of the EU. Migration and asylum issues were analysed with taking 
into account empirical, analytical and political comparisons of Western Balkans and North 
African countries from the triple win solution point of view. The research attempts to 
emphasize Western Balkans migration experience in order to respond how to manage and/or 
control chaotic migration with respect to North African countries. In a sense, the EU 
enlargement and neighbourhood policies have significant effects on EU migration dynamics 
of demographic change (i.e. ageing population) and convergence/divergence of EU member 
states’ priorities for migration policies. From this standpoint, the role of the triangle 
(hybridity) – state, private and civil society in migration research ought to be argued to verify 
whether a controlling migration by an ideal hybrid structure and indirect centralisation will be 
more effective and accurate or not. The research presents dialectics of triple win approach 
and hybrid model (i.e. home country-state, host country-private, and civil society-migrants) 
with using governance models. The main argument was tested methodologically through 
using case study research, grounded theory, constructivist and normative approaches. 
Keywords: Hybrid Model, Controlling Migration, Social Transformation, Western Balkans, 
North Africa, Indirect Centralisation 
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Introduction 
Migration and asylum are very sensitive issues which should be considered with the 
European values such as; democratisation, fairness, antidiscrimination, protection of human 
rights, and enhancing liberty in the context of the EU law. With respect to the European 
norms and values, the EU has created policies and structured the EU supranational law which 
has legally binding force for all member states. The EU started to shape a common migration 
policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to structure intergovernmental 
cooperation. Then, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included migration policies 
at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into acquis 
communitaire. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental 
cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the 
third countries (Bia 2004; Faist and Ette 2007). Likewise, the TFEU has centralised the 
power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the centralisation to Brussels 
has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues. At national level, the 
EU respects all member states’ own constitutions and regulations because all member states 
have their sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and 
asylum flows, are referring to their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU 
attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa 
policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and back illegal migrant 
agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional 
cooperation and enlargement policy. Thus, the Western Balkans and North Africa appear as 
two regions which have high priorities for regional cooperation and strategic partnership for 
the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming more closer to these countries. 
Recently, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalisations, social and cultural funds, 
financial aid and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as 
twenty-eighth EU member state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalisation 
talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve interparty agreement (government-opposition) 
and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to be perceived as great 
successes of the EU efforts. 
The EU adopted the Immigration and Asylum Pact in 2008 to consolidate its efforts 
towards a common migration and integration policy and also to deal with North African 
migration flows. This policy is based on an agreement between member states to apply 
common principles in the field of migration and asylum. Afterwards, in 2010, the European 
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Council approved the Stockholm Programme which covers the period 2010-2014. 
Admittedly, the EU places a high priority on the Lisbon Agenda’s aim to create a knowledge-
based society. At the core point of this framework, Europeanisation
1
 is emphasized on 
security, the human rights legislation and the development of restrictive migration policies in 
the EU. From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights 
which are guaranteed by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding 
migration and asylum issues. The judicial complaints, debates and sceptic attitudes in France, 
Italy, Germany and Spain against migration policies and Schengen regulations have 
illustrated this fact perfectly (see Table A1 for Schengen visa statistics). In 2009, only these 
four countries have received approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 
49.02 per cent of total visas) in Schengen zone. With these facts in mind, the harmonisation 
of EU migration policy and new approaches were examined for finding out whether the EU 
puts barriers to the free movement of persons and workers of non-EU citizens (i.e. the 
citizens of Western Balkan and North African countries) or not. For the Western Balkan 
countries visa liberalisations have provided overstay of migrants and asylum applications. 
However, what differs Western Balkans from the North African countries is that all Western 
Balkan countries’ (currently except Kosovo) citizens are allowed to enter any EU member 
state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they move to any 
member state within this process. Whereas the North African countries’ citizens generally 
have refugee status waiting for enjoying their asylum right because of the repressive political 
regimes and internal conflicts in their countries. Chronically, some matters of free movement 
lay on the circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to 
establish their lives with their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit 
country through applying for international protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are 
sending back immigrants to the previous country from where they have entered (i.e. first 
asylum principle). Hypothetically, international law and national regulations have many 
system blanks which are filled in by human smugglers and illegal migrants. Albeit, hard law 
regulations have illustrated the fact that illegal migrants cannot do anything else until they 
                                                          
1
 Europeanisation can be understood in terms of a limited set of ordinary processes of change (or transformation 
for engagement). The term Europeanisation involves the changes in external boundaries, developing institutions 
at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political 
organisation and a political unification project (Olsen 2002). According to Wallace, Europeanisation is the 
development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-border connections, such 
that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames politics and policy within the European 
states (Wallace 2000: 370). 
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guarantee better living standards for their families, that absolutely means researchers and 
policy makers should reconsider alternative ways to tackle with illegal migration issues. 
Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental reasons through using empirical data and 
attempts to propose a hybrid model that covers the active participations of state, private, civil 
society actors in order to embed hybridity in migration and asylum research, and respond to 
migration issues with a controlling migration approach which is based on theoretical 
assumptions and practical reasons and consists of migration driving forces; such as legal 
regulations, capacity building, remittances, hybrid organisations, labour policy of states, 
economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. As is reflected, there 
are interrelationships and dialectics among triple win model (home country, host country and 
migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home country nexus, private-host country nexus and 
migrants-civil society nexus. Undoubtedly, hybrid model has a catalyst role in terms of 
balancing social problems and civil society needs. With this regard, it is better to perceive the 
hybrid model a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal 
recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. In general, the main 
research question is ‘how hybridity can be embedded in migration and asylum research and 
what is the role and influence of the indirect centralisation process? Supportive follow up 
questions are as such: Can hybridity be an effective solution to better control and manage 
migration and asylum matters? Is a controlling migration approach which consists of 
alternative and innovative soft law regulations, an accurate model or strategy for 
embeddedness of general/real or specific/ideal hybridisation in migration and asylum 
research? How can classical migration theories be reformulated or reconsidered in the context 
of hybridisation of migration issues in public sphere with governance via governments’ 
participation? What are the implications of hybridisation for an ideal triple win solution and 
why states ought to include indirect centralisation process as a hybridisation tool for better 
managing and controlling migration? What will be the role of migrants who have hybrid 
identities at the process of EU enlargement, integration, collaboration, and intercultural 
dialogue among EU, Western Balkans and North Africa?  
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Methodology and Background 
The argument of this study was structured with applications of the third way approach 
(Giddens 2000) and the theory of structuration, the theory of communicative action (Die 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) – Labour, Family, Media and Language interactions 
(Habermas 1990) and theory-practice understanding. Hybrid model can be an effective 
strategy for social transformation of controlling migration approach, and in order to link the 
transition to the praxis of social transformation, paradigmatic and philosophical critical 
approaches (Apel 2011) were included to the research. Rather starting with a hypothesis, in 
this study the main hypothesis will be verified (or falsified) at the end of the research. 
Eisenhardt’s technique which means doing an empirical study with a special focus to data and 
then generating theory or theoretical model (Eisenhardt 1989: 549) was used in order to 
conduct research in the context of grounded theory. In other words, this study attempts to 
create a transition from practice to theory and hence the grounded theory method (GTM) was 
used to highlight how data and analysis, methodologically, become constructed. The data of 
two regions were reached up to construct abstractions and then down to tie these abstractions 
to data. Starting with the EU and Western Balkans relations and in this framework, countries’ 
political relations and empirical migration data include both the specific and the general 
concepts were investigated in order to explore their links to larger issues or creating larger 
unrecognised issues in entirety. Thus, GTM in migration research can provide a route to see 
beyond the obvious and a path to reach imaginative interpretations (Bryant and Charmaz 
2007: 13). Meanwhile, GTM is categorised as an inductive method which is a type of 
reasoning that begins with study of a range of individual cases and extrapolates from them to 
form a conceptual category. It should be added that, one of the concerns often expressed by 
researchers is when to stop collecting data and how to balance the comparison analysis 
among two regions or many countries? A researcher stops when there is no need to continue, 
i.e. ‘achieving the point of theoretical saturation’ (Bryant and Charmaz 2007: 281). The 
constant comparison of interchangeable indicators in the data yields the properties and 
dimensions of each category, or concept. This process of constant comparison continues until 
no new properties or dimensions are emerging. At this point, a concept has been theoretically 
saturated. 
Initially, the research presents a comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
countries, and then with normative, theoretical and philosophical perspectives, the section 
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second constructs controlling migration and hybrid model within the framework of two case 
comparisons and dialectics of triple win and hybrid model. 
Why the Western Balkans and North African countries were chosen for a comparison 
analysis which tests migration flows, indirect centralisation and hybridisation? 
Geographically, the two regions were examined as a comparative case study because the EU 
has integration and neighbourhood policies for these two regions. The first region, the 
Western Balkans, consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain 
date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth member state of the EU. All other Western 
Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate achievement on their 
national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in these 
states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not 
possible with merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital 
flows and direct investments will enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic 
actions with civil society in Western Balkans. The other region is North Africa. In fact, it is 
also known as Southern Mediterranean region or the Maghreb. However, the research stresses 
the recent events in North Africa. Therefore, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia 
were included to the analyses as North African countries (excluding Sudan, Mauritania and 
Western Sahara). The EU has neighbourhood policies for North African countries and in this 
context the partnership relations will accelerate hybridisation and indirect centralisation 
process in North Africa. From international migration point of view, both cases are sui 
generis and linked to each other. The European Commission has been published many 
analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly these countries of two regions. Above 
all, from the European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for 
pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the 
EU and externally in Western Balkans and North Africa. Agreeably, the distance among the 
EU and these two regions is a factor that distinguishes these two regions from other regions 
of the world. The EU considers the relationship with these two regions as both strategy and 
security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of these two 
regions and that’s why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an 
effective strategy for the EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes. 
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various 
conferences in European Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of 
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Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit: Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was 
entitled ‘The EU’s Enlargement Policy’ and the conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the 
Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s Asylum Policy’. The author has 
also participated in a conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der Historische 
Materialismus.’ The conference was organised on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. 
Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas 
(Universität Frankfurt am Main) and many other social scientists have participated as 
speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal in Germany. The author achieved 
the opportunity and honour to discuss hybridity issue with Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel at the end 
of the conference. Altogether, the author has improved the hybridity notion and application 
from two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) and 
ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The 
author has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head 
of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The 
outcomes of the in-depth interview were very significant in terms of the EU integration and 
development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg 
Intercultural Center as a hybrid case are likely to spread and networked in the future. 
Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases, the 
European Commission and the International Organisation for Migration published reports in 
order to analyse each state and region separately and then compare the illustrations for 
finding out similarities and differences among each other. 
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1The Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
Countries 
1.1. General Overview of the EU and Western Balkan Relations 
After the collapse of Soviet Union and since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, the emerging 
countries in the Western Balkans have endured a painful set of multiple transitions. 
Pathetically, countries in the region shared almost the same fate during this period. For 
stabilisation of the Balkan peninsula, the European Union created Stabilisation Association 
Process
2
 (SAP) and during this process signed Stabilisation Association Agreements (SAAs) 
with each Western Balkan country. Thus, we can put forward that there is a nexus between 
European Union’s political attitude and stabilisation and development of Western Balkan 
region as a whole. The EU wants to prevent itself from illegal migration flows and hence 
works in order to ensure stabilisation and development to the Western Balkan countries. It is 
assumed that the integration of Western Balkan countries within the European Union will 
effectively stabilise the region. Substantially, the European Commission is giving a crucial 
priority to Western Balkans integration within the EU because the EU shares common 
cultural and historical values with these countries. If we focus on the region, we can 
acknowledge that the Western Balkans had already become a part of Europe in different 
dimensions. Therefore, initially, the EU is respecting the Western Balkan countries’ 
applications in order to approve them as full member states of the EU in the near future. 
However, political situations and decisions in various countries in this region make the 
negotiation process more complicated. Unavoidably, the integration process of Western 
Balkans is strongly related to governments’ foreign policies, implementation of reforms and 
achieving European standards. In 2003, the EU declared that the future of the Balkans is 
within the European Union. Yet the results of the French and Dutch referendums on the 
Constitutional Treaty, the EU shifted to a more restrictive enlargement strategy. With the 
Thessaloniki Summit the European Council attempted to develop a common policy on illegal 
immigration, external borders, the return of illegal migrants and cooperation with third 
countries (Council of the European Union 2003: 3). Since the enlargement of 1 May 2004, 
the EU and the Western Balkans have become even closer neighbours and the EU’s desire for 
a common migration policy was increased (European Commission 2005: 3). Recently, the EU 
has been debating about the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone. The 
                                                          
2
 The SAP pursues three aims, namely stabilisation and a swift transition to a market economy, the promotion of 
regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession (European Commission 2007a: 14). 
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border reforms of these countries are going slowly; and for aught as is known, the European 
Union expects to include these countries to the Schengen Zone until 2015 (European 
Commission 2007a). However, the Netherlands has opposed the inclusion of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the Schengen Zone because of not achieving required EU standards in various 
areas. Assuredly, it is in the best interest of all of Europe to promote democratic 
transformation and transition to required EU standards in the Western Balkan countries in 
order to consolidate stability. 
Breadthwise, for the integration of Western Balkans within the EU, meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria is not the merely set of requirements and conditions for the EU 
accession. The best example of this is Macedonia which had the best prospects for being 
accepted by the EU. The problem that slowed the accession process and negotiations down 
was the issue of the dispute over the name of the country with Greece (Slovak Atlantic 
Commission 2010). Obviously, that means the EU will not allow a country hindered by 
serious bilateral political or other problems to join its structures. It is necessary to present and 
communicate the inevitable political and economic reforms awaited from the Western Balkan 
countries as to be made foremost in favour of their internal stabilisation, then in favour of the 
EU accession. Principally, the EU’s strategy for the Western Balkans contained a number of 
key elements
3
 which flow through and dictate dealings with potential candidate countries. 
These are as follows (Brown and Attenborough 2007: 10): Tailored Country Strategies, 
Regional Cooperation and Conditionality. However, some key challenges for EU regarding 
the Western Balkan countries’ integration process are listed as such: a) Increased focus on 
strengthening the rule of law and public administration reform; b) Ensuring freedom of 
expression in the media; c) Enhancing regional cooperation and reconciliation in the Western 
Balkans; d) Achieving sustainable economic recovery and embracing Europe 2020;                                
e) Extending transport and energy networks (European Commission 2011b). 
For development of the Western Balkan countries and dealing with issues stated above, 
the Commission provides financial and technical support to the enlargement countries for 
their preparation for accession. Assistance is provided essentially under the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), under which total allocation over the period 2007-2013 is 
€11.6 billion. 
                                                          
3
 Each country will progress towards the goal of accession based on its own merits, irrespective of how other 
countries in the region are progressing. Regional cooperation is based on a recognition that the Western Balkans 
as a whole needs to improve intrapolitical and economic relations, good neighbourliness if each individual 
country is to move forward (European Commission 2005: 4). 
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Thoroughly, the integration of the Western Balkan countries and migration issues in 
these countries are strongly interrelated because the EU has a very high number of migrants 
whose origin countries are at this region. Generally, the typology of entry of migrants from 
these countries differ widely between member states. While family reunification is 
considerable in some countries, like Austria, France or Sweden, other member states, like 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK, had a high percentage of work-related immigration 
(European Commission 2007b: 3). Specifically, the cooperation on migration policy issues 
between Western Balkan countries and the EU is part of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) as the overarching theme of EU relations with the Western Balkans. Relevant 
to the migration issues, the Western Balkans have seen mass migration flows, including 
illegal migration and human trafficking (Kathuria 2008). 
Juristically, Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) specified common asylum, immigration and border 
control policy objectives with Article 67, 78, and 79 in Title V (i.e. Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice). There are projects which might turn out the realistic view to an ideal 
type for Western Balkan countries; such as the South East European Cooperation Process 
(SEECP). SEECP, a forum for regional cooperation, is involved in the process of creating a 
new regional framework, which will be the regionally owned successor of the Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe (European Commission 2007c: 5). These projects have not only 
optimistic means for immigrants but also are desirable for asylum seekers. The Balkans 
affects directly or indirectly most of the EU reforms in the field of asylum. The efficacy of 
governments in the region to implement legislative and administrative reforms, absorb 
projects and financial support, and establish institutions are crucial elements for the success 
of EU reform (Peshkopia 2005). Practicably, a challenge is that the EU and the UNHCR are 
not in complete agreement regarding interests, concepts and actions about asylum systems in 
the Balkans. 
Another aspect of integration process is the perception of the EU upon migration and 
asylum issues. On the one side, legal migration plays an important role in enhancing the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development, and strategically 
contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy (Council of the European Union 
2004: 19). On the other side, illegal migration is a deliberate act intended to gain entry into, 
residence or employment in the territory of a state, contrary to the rules and conditions 
applicable in that state (Europol 2007: 5). The EU encourages legal migration particularly 
skilled workers of Western Balkan countries, whereas creates policies in order to fight against 
12 
 
illegal migration. Basically for the EU, cooperation in matters of immigration and asylum is 
one of the most recently addressed aspects of the Western Balkan integration within the EU 
(Lavenex 2009). Vigourously, the European Council emphasizes the need for intensified 
cooperation and capacity building to enable the EU member states that are neighbours to 
Western Balkan countries better to manage migration and to provide adequate protection for 
asylum seekers
4
. Systematically, the support for capacity building in national asylum 
systems, border control and wider cooperation on migration issues will be provided to those 
countries that demonstrate a genuine commitment to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees (Council of the European Union 2004: 22). It should be noted that 
some asylum applicants may remain in a country on a temporary or permanent basis even if 
they are not deemed to be refugees under the 1951 Convention definition (e.g. asylum 
applicants may be granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection statuses). As a 
matter of fact, migrant and/or asylum seeker sending countries have been seen as part of the 
integration problem associated with immigrants, and partnerships with third countries have 
been largely framed to prevent or control unwanted migration (Kirişçi 2009: 119). In May 
2006, the Council of the European Union adopted an Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on 
improving cooperation on organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and counter-
terrorism between the EU, Western Balkans and other ENP (European Neighbourhood 
Policy) countries (Europol 2007: 5). The Council invited Europol and Frontex to determine 
the high risk routes
5
 in the Western Balkan countries. As a consequence, the Western Balkans 
is not merely a region of origin for illegal migrants into the European Union, but also a transit 
region for migrants from other parts of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 In this respect, asylum applications refer to all persons who apply on an individual basis for asylum or similar 
protection, irrespective of whether they lodge their application on arrival or from inside the country, and 
irrespective of whether they entered the country legally or illegally (Eurostat 2010: 199). 
5
 With respect to this basic issue, the main high risk routes that have been identified originate in Albania and 
pass through either Kosovo-Serbia-Croatia or through Montenegro-Serbia-Croatia, towards Slovenia, Hungary 
or Italy. The exact routes vary depending on changes in policy and countermeasures undertaken by the Western 
Balkan countries (Europol 2007: 2). 
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1.2. Country Analyses: Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia 
With an approximately 3.1 million
6
 total population (Republika e Shqipërisë Instituti i 
Statistikës 2010), Albania represents the most dramatic instance of postcommunist migration 
(UNDP 2010: 2). The Albanian Department of Emigration within the Albanian Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs data related to Albanian emigration figures are specified as; 1 
million immigrants from approximately population of 3.1 million inhabitants; 22-25 per cent 
of the total population; 35 per cent of active population; Albanian migratory flows 5-6 times 
higher than those in comparable developing countries, concerning the active population 
(Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010a). According to 
World Bank Albania bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of 
migrants in host countries is 1438451. Throughout the transition period, Albania experienced 
a steady increase in the number of emigrants living abroad (Castaldo Litchfield and Reilly 
2005: 157). Relatively, the scale of internal migration has induced a radical demographic 
transformation within the country. However, for a sizeable portion of internal migrants, the 
process represents a prelude to an external move. For instance; In Greece (2003), according 
to the European Commission's Annual Report on Statistics of Migration, Asylum and 
Returns, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 434810. In Italy (2006), 
ISTAT and the Italian Office of Statistics registered 348813 living and working Albanian 
citizens. In the U.S. (2005), according to general census of population, the number of living 
and working Albanian citizens is 113661. In the UK (2005), government report included 50 
thousand living and working Albanian citizens. In Canada (2001), according to general 
census of population, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 14935. In 
Germany (2002), Federal Statistical Office confirmed 11630 living and working Albanian 
citizens (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010b). Despite the 
fact that Greece and Italy remain the main receiving countries, other destinations such as the 
USA, the UK and Canada have become attractive to an increasing number of Albanian 
emigrants. Symptomatically, if we highlight the profile of emigrants, we may find out a more 
tragic truth. According to Barjaba, between 1990 and 2003, approximately 45 per cent of 
Albanian university professors and researchers emigrated, and more than 65 per cent of 
scholars who received graduate degrees in the West during 1980-1990 chose to remain there 
                                                          
6
 However, based on Instat 2011 Census data , the total population of Albania is 2,831,741. The population of 
Albania has decreased by 7.7% in about ten years (Instat 2011: 14). Large scale emigration and fertility decline 
are supposed to be the main causes of the observed population decrease.  
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(Barjarba 2004: 233). After visa liberalisation in 2011, the predictions point out that the 
brain-drain will have an incline trend in the future. The lack of Albanian legislation in this 
area causes the emigration of its intellectual future. Many well-educated Albanian migrants 
prefer to establish their lives in host countries in the EU. This fact significantly explains the 
decline of the total population and demographic change in Albania. Meanwhile, Albanian 
migration matures and processes of family reunion and settlement take place in host societies 
(King and Vullnetari 2003: 51). This leads to a reorientation of migrants’ savings and 
investments towards the host society, and a consequent falling-off of remittances. 
On the other hand, von Beyme argued that elite recruitment as effective policy process 
significantly influenced the regime transition period in Western Balkans (von Beyme 1993). 
Moreover, modernising economic elites of Western Balkan countries have a driving force at 
integration to the EU and world market economy. However, there is a matter that generally 
economic elites in these countries are mafia actors who have very strong relations with state 
actors. 
Many scholars argued the mass Albanian emigration flows period, i.e. the post-1990 era 
(King and Vullnetari 2003; King 2005; Vullnetari 2007; Aliu 2011a). Historically, the mass 
Albanian emigration flows begin with Embassy crisis. During the summer of 1990 up to 5 
thousand Albanians sought refuge in Western embassies in Tirana. Between the embassy 
invasion and February 1991, an estimated 20 thousand Albanian migrants had left the state. 
With the chaos triggered boat exoduses to Italy, during 1991-1992, an estimated 200 
thousand Albanians left the country. In 1997, the crisis of the pyramid system which also 
happened in other Soviet bloc countries, occurred in Albania and the country descended into 
civil war conflict. Internal rebellion which began first in Albania spread to Kosovo as a 
domino effect (Aliu 2011a). Pyramid schemes' collapse triggered a period of utter economic 
and political chaos, and brought down the government. In 1998, the long-awaited 
regularisation of irregular immigrants in Greece took place; two-third of those regularised 
were Albanians. In the same year, Albanians were also prominent in the regularisations in 
Italy. The economic recovery after the pyramid fiasco was remarkably rapid (GDP grew by 
12 per cent in 1998), but a still-fragile Albania was destabilised by the Kosovar refugee crisis 
in 1999; 500 thousand ethnic-Albanian Kosovar refugees entered northern Albania, putting 
enormous pressure on the country's poorest region. During 2000-2010 according to the World 
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Bank data, Albanian net migration
7
 (total migration) numbers are as such: -270245 (2000),    
-72243 (2005) and -47889 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has 
decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by 
country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 
2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock
8
: 76695 (2000) 2.5 per cent 
of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of 
population (see Table A2). Sceptically, some scholars implied that future trends may change 
statistical illustrations. For example, there is high return potential among long-term migrants 
from Greece and Italy (as a consequence of sovereign debt crisis) which is expected to take 
place over the coming 5-10 years. Realistically, large-scale family-based return migration 
seems unlikely. So to speak, Albanian community networks have enhanced and encouraged 
business opportunities and strengthened Albania’s comparative and competitive advantages 
for inclusion of return migrants (Geniş and Maynard 2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010). 
Another Western Balkan state is FYR Macedonia. Migration from the Republic of 
Macedonia to foreign countries is basically determined by the changes in socio-economic 
development and political stability in the country. Changes regarding the restrictions and 
selectiveness of migration policies in the receiving countries also have significant effects on 
the migration process (Nikolovska 2004). Officially, in Macedonia, the total number of 
migrants is high while the Macedonian Agency for Emigration estimates that there are about 
350 thousand Macedonian citizens living abroad, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
this number amounts to 800 thousand (Center for Research and Policy Making 2007). 
According to World Bank Macedonia bilateral estimates of migrant stock data 2010, total 
number of migrants in host countries is 447 thousand (21.9 per cent of population). In fact, 
the exact number of emigrants, and immigrants is unknown as there were 5613 claims for 
asylum by Macedonians in 2001 and 5549 in 2002, with a low 2 per cent recognition rate and 
a 7 per cent total rate of protection, which likely accounts for a certain number of returning 
migrants. Even though no information is available about the ethnicity of the asylum-seekers, 
the circumstantial evidence indicates that many are members of either the Albanian or of the 
                                                          
7
 The sum of the entries or arrivals of immigrants, and of exits, or departures of emigrants, yields the total 
volume of migration, and is termed total migration, as distinct from net migration, or the migration balance, 
resulting from the difference between arrivals and departures. This balance is called net immigration when 
arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals (IOM 2004: 65). 
8
 International migration stock is the number of people in country other than that in which they live, i.e. the 
stock of foreign born residents. The international migrant stock numbers are obtained mainly from population 
censuses and derived from the data on foreign-born population – people who have residence in one country but 
were born in another country. That means people who are citizens of a country other than the country in which 
they reside (The World Bank 2010).  
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Roma minority (Ibid). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net 
migration numbers are as such: -9000 (2000), -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee 
population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 9050 refugees in 2000 to 
1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has 
increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the 
international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population, and 129701 (2010) 
6.3 per cent of population (see Table A2). Commensurably, the 2002 population census 
indicated 86 thousand immigrants, or 4.3 per cent of the total population, slightly below the 
93 thousand (4.8 per cent) of the previous census of 1994. Among the immigrants counted in 
the 2002 census, 63 per cent were from Serbia and Montenegro and around 10 per cent from 
Greece. Besides, the majority (i.e. 1900 migrants) who had a residence permit, comes from 
Serbia and Montenegro (Kupiszewski 2009). According to the updated list of registered 
voters presented at the beginning of May 2007 by the Ministry of Justice there are 59650 
voters staying abroad up to one year out of 1742316 registered voters in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (International Organisation for Migration 2007c: 15). The population 
census of 2002 identified 22995 people being abroad for a period of up to one year and 
another 12128 staying longer. Recent research reveals that 56.3 per cent of Macedonian 
migrants have been staying in their host countries for two to five years. Women are more 
likely to stay less than 2 years while men are believed to spend longer periods in the 
destination country. Top five EU states that Macedonian migrants prefer are Italy, Germany, 
Austria, Slovenia and France. 
The situation in Kosovo9 which is another Western Balkan state, so-called the new born 
(the 4-year-old) state, is more tragic. Migration has certainly been an outcome of the state’s 
economic backwardness. Resolvedly, Kosovar men migrate as the only hope to provide 
prosperity for their families and to escape poverty (Vathi and Black 2007). Actually, 
displacements in and from Kosovo did not begin with the NATO bombing on 24 March 
1999. The scale of displacement and exodus became enormous after that date, but the fact 
that displacements were already taking place, and the genocide of ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo by Serbian military and police were being reported and observed by international 
press and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, was one of 
                                                          
9
 Surface of Kosovo (SoK) is 10908.1 km². According to the SoK assessment, the number of habitual residents 
is 2.1 million inhabitants with the ethnic composition: Albanians 92 per cent; Other ethnic groups comprise of 8 
per cent of the total number of population (Republika e Kosovës Ministria e Administratës Publike Enti i 
Statistikës së Kosovës 2011). 
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the most outspoken reasons given for embarking on the NATO intervention. Rapidly, 
between 1995 and 1997 at least 114430 asylum applications had been lodged in EU member 
states by people coming from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Selm 2000: 4). Kosovo’s 
proximity to the EU created strong political support for the military intervention and 
tremendous humanitarian and development assistance. Undeservedly, the UN Peace Accord 
(Resolution 1244) did not resolve the more fundamental issue of Kosovo’s status and since 
the creation of the provisional government by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) there has 
been a confused set of governance arrangements. Kosovo faced the transition of UN 
administration to EULEX and a national government, supervised by a postindependence 
International Civilian Representative (Chapman et al. 2008). Professedly, Kosovo’s Feburary 
2008 declaration of independence recognised by 91 countries

 and alas contested by Serbia, 
China and Russia. 
European policy makers willingly expect Kosovo to experience ‘zero migration’. 
Properly speaking, there is a high dependence of Kosovo’s economy on remittances. Around 
30 per cent of Kosovo’s families have one or more family member(s) that lives abroad. 
Approximately 39 per cent of emigrants live in Germany, 23 per cent in Switzerland, in Italy 
6 per cent, in Austria 7 per cent, in Great Britain 4 per cent, in Sweden 5 per cent, in the USA 
3.5 per cent and France, Canada and Croatia 2 per cent in each (Ministry of Internal Affairs 
2009: 8). According to World Bank migration data total number of bilateral migrant stocks 
for host country is; 25251, and top destination EU countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and 
the UK. There was also a relatively large inflow of Kosovar return migrants in the late 1990s 
in response to the political stabilisation following the NATO intervention and the withdrawal 
of their temporary protection status by Germany
10
. Triumphantly, recent events on 
normalisation of political situation and harmonisation and Europeanisation of Kosovo’s 
institutions have created stable ambiance for Kosovar return migrants. As an evidence, 
Kosovo and Serbia has started a normalisation process
11
, a process of dialogue between 
Prishtina and Belgrade, a dialogue also known as talks on talks in order to strengthen their 
relationship with each other. Although it’s known that there are stark differences on the 
                                                          

 Quoted from;  2 June 2012; http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/  
10
 The European Stability Initiative estimated that 174 thousand Kosovars left Germany at that time, the largest 
return movement from any EU country. 
11
 The conditions to explicitly encourage the European integration of one another will be created within this 
process, although the differences in opinion on the status will remain. This means the creation of a measurable 
process that would allow all the EU member states to consider Kosovo as a contractual partner, including those 
that have not recognised Kosovo’s independence. Praiseworthily, this measurable progress will qualify Serbia as 
a state which is creating the basis for resolving its neighborhood problems which is an important objective for 
the states having recognised Kosovo’s independence and that will have to decide on Serbia’s accession path. 
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existence of an independent Kosovo, the political authorities of both countries should define 
open topics that can be treated between the two countries without taking Kosovo’s status into 
consideration. It is obvious that the success in the Balkans has been achieved only when an 
intensive true cooperation between the EU and the USA has existed. The diplomatic visits of 
EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine M. Ashton and US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton 
to Western Balkan countries brought important contributions for stability of the region (Aliu 
2011a). The normalisation of the Kosovo-Serbia relations through the reappearance of this 
collaboration as part of a transatlantic regional integration policy will cause to an 
implementation of a transitory process of nonstatutory normalisation between Serbia and 
Kosovo (Surroi 2009: 20). Recently, Serbia and Kosovo have signed a crucial agreement 
which Serbia recognises technically Kosovo’s sovereignty and gives to Kosovo the 
representation right as an independent state under the condition that Kosovo must use 
footnote which indicates the UNSCR 1244 resolution and ICJ advisory decision. 
Kosovo continues to benefit from the Instrument for Preaccession Assistance (IPA), 
macrofinancial assistance, the Instrument for Stability and other sources of funding. Kosovo 
participates in the IPA multibeneficiary programmes including in an IPA crisis response 
package developed in 2008. The package is fully operational in 2010. A total of €508 million 
of EU assistance has been committed to Kosovo for the period 2008–2011. During 2010, a 
total of €67.3 million granted in the IPA annual programme for 2010 was allocated in close 
coordination with the Ministry for European Integration and government institutions 
(European Commission 2010c: 6). 
Montenegro, another Western Balkan state with the lowest population
12
, has better 
migration dynamics comparing to its neighbours. Montenegro has been accepted as the EU 
candidate state recently, and its European perspective was reaffirmed by the Council in June 
2006 after the recognition of the country's independence from Serbia and EU member states. 
Montenegro submitted an application for EU membership on 15 December 2008. In line with 
Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the member states requested, on 23 April 2009, that the 
European Commission prepare an opinion upon the merits of the application (Delegation of 
the European Union 2011b). As of 19 December 2009 EU visa were altered, allowing 
Montenegro’s citizens (along neighbours from Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, in 2011 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania) visa-free access to all 25 
                                                          
12
 Estimated population of the Republic of Montenegro (2007) is 625,000 inhabitants; Urban 62 per cent (2003), 
in 2006 population growth (annual, per cent) was 0.16, life expectancy at birth in 2007 was average 72.7; Male 
70.6 and Female 74.8 (UNDP 2009: 7). 
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Schengen member states within the Union, as well as two states outside the European Union; 
the UK and Ireland. This was a result of a process that was launched in May 2008. Granting 
of visa-free travel required the fulfilment of key benchmarks in the areas of rule of law, travel 
documents and border security. 
Immigrants to Montenegro mostly originate from other countries within the Western 
Balkan region. According to the Employment Agency of Montenegro, the majority of labour 
migrants originate from Serbia (56 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (27 per cent), Kosovo 
(11 per cent), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3 per cent) and another 3 per cent 
is unknown (International Organisation for Migration 2007a: 14). During 2000-2010 
according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as such: -32450 
(2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas 
refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 
to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is a decline at the international migration stock: 54583 
(2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of population (see Table 
A2). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which has the most complicated political and judicial 
system (i.e. three independent administrative and legislative areas – Federation, Republica 
Srpska and Brčko according to the Dayton Accords which was signed in 1995) in Western 
Balkans, shares almost the same situation with Kosovo. Painfully, the population of BiH 
dwindled from 4.4 million inhabitants in 1989 to 3.8 million in 2004. The loss of more than 
650 thousand individuals amounted to a decrease of 14.7 per cent of the population only in 5 
years. In 1995, Serbian Army made genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia and this criminal act 
caused a loss of tens of thousands of Bosnian people. 
Figures released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2007 show that 1343805 
citizens of BiH are currently living abroad, whereas the World Bank Remittance Migration 
and Remittances Factbook for BiH refers to a figure as high as 1471594. It is estimated that 
more than 800 thousand are living in other parts of Europe (such as, Germany, Sweden, 
Norway, Italy, Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Switzerland) and nearly half a million in the USA 
and Canada (International Organisation for Migration 2007d: 15). The top destination EU 
countries are Croatia (EU member in 2013), Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and 
France. The 2003 European Commission Annual Report on Asylum and Migration highlights 
1042 BiH citizens apprehended in Sweden in 2003 and 387 in Slovenia, for the same year. 
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There were 866 BiH citizens refused entry on the Czech Republic, 254 in Bulgaria, 819 in 
Hungary, and a 5226 in Slovenia. In terms of removed BiH citizens, 295 from Denmark, 123 
from Finland, 1352 from Sweden, 704 from Norway, and 271 from Slovenia. In 2004, 2144 
BiH nationals were sent back to their country, primarily from Sweden (28 per cent) and 
Germany (22 per cent). In 2005, 1533 citizens of BiH were deported on various grounds to 
BiH from countries in Western Europe and other countries (International Organisation for 
Migration 2007d: 21). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina net migration numbers are as such: 281795 (2000), 61825 (2005) and -10000 
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 
refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and refugee population by country of territory of 
origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well. There 
is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 
35141 (2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population (see 
Table A2). Eventually, the main challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina are divergence of 
administrative institutions on migration policy and regulations, weakness of migration control 
and management, lack of coordination and migration databases and an uncertain migration 
agenda. 
Another more complex case is the Republic of Serbia. It must be highlighted that 
several limitations exist that hinder the conduct of a comprehensive analysis of the current 
situation concerning migration trends in Serbia. First of all, there are many data sets and 
sources about Serbia but some of them include both Montenegro and Kosovo, the others 
include either Montenegro or Kosovo. In this case, the confusion occurs at analysing 
specifically the Serbian migrants and refugees with the exclusion of Montenegrin and 
Kosovar migrants and refugees. Based on estimates, between 3.2 and 3.8 million Serbs or 
persons of Serbian origin live outside Serbia’s borders. However, estimates of Serbian 
emigrants by the Ministry of Diaspora range is from 3.9 million to 4.2 million (Siar 2008: 
23). According to Siar (2008), in 2005, the total number of immigrants is 512336 (4.9 per 
cent of total population), in 2007, total number of refugees is 97417 and in the same year 
total number of Asylum seekers is 64, and the number of labour migrant is 6324 (excluding 
Kosovo/UNSC 1244). Besides, in 2005, total number of emigrants is; 2298352. Main EU 
countries of destination are Germany, Austria, Croatia (EU member in 2013), Sweden and 
Italy. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are 
as such: -147889 (2000), -338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or 
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territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, 
whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748 
refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international 
migration stock: 856763 (2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of 
population, and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of population (see Table A2). 
Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkans to the EU have also economic 
consequences and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both inward 
remittance flows and outward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 
million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, 
the outward remittance flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached 
$10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $1749 
million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.2 billion. Respectively, in 2003, 
the outward remittance flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows 
reached $61 million. In Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and 
in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $401 million. Rhythmically, in 2003, the 
outward remittance flows is $16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached 
$26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward 
remittance flows from $138 million in 2008 to $91 million in 2009. Another economic 
consequence of migration flows is workers’ remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 
billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4 billion, FYR Macedonia 
$260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion. 
Table A2 illustrates another aspect of immigration from Western Balkans to the EU. 
Feminisation of immigration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight 
the fact that a high percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per 
cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 
61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females. Adhering to the data 
given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific 
immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and 
antidiscriminative solutions. At supranational level, the European Commission should amend 
immigration regulations with a guarantee of full protection of female migrants’ rights. No 
doubt, feminisation of migration is an important factor for demographic change in the EU and 
might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminisation of migration has 
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also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win 
and hybrid model which will be argued in section second. 
The EU is very optimistic regarding the development and integration of Western 
Balkans. The European Commission progress reports and published documents of 
international institutions for these countries are stressing the importance of peace, stability 
and security in Western Balkans, and the EC welcomes all efforts of the Western Balkan 
countries to come closer to the EU (European Commission 2006; European Commission 
2008; European Commission 2010a; European Commission 2010b; EUobserver 2010; 
Delegation of the European Union 2011a; Delegation of the European Union 2011b; 
European Commission 2011i; European Commission 2011j). Broadly, nationalism, 
transitional justice, returnees, regions of concern, education, civil society and peacebuilders 
were identified as being the biggest obstacles to lasting peace and stability in the Western 
Balkan region (Shaw 2009). Periodically, the EU will cooperate and assist the Western 
Balkan countries to overcome these challenges and adopt Europeanisation systematically. 
Kukan (2010) argued that the EU ought to; use lessons from the previous enlargements, have 
a clear vision of enlargement process, attain political and popular consensus in both sides (i.e. 
the EU and the Western Balkans), achieve conditionality, tailored country strategies, regional 
cooperation and merit based approach for common European perspective, and consider the 
Western Balkans as a whole not canalising to the individual countries (Kukan 2010: 36-37). 
In the framework of Stabilisation Association Process, Kukan’s recommendations are very 
significant for dealing with challenges in the region. 
According to the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework for IPA for the years 
2011-2013: Albania will receive an indicative allocation of €228.82 million of preaccession 
funds including IPA Component II – Cross border cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
receive an indicative allocation of €328.7 million of preaccession funds. The current 
Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework 2011-2013 allocates a further €212.4 million to 
Kosovo. Macedonia will receive an indicative allocation of €320.3 million of preaccession 
funds. Montenegro will receive an indicative allocation of €104.9 million of preaccession 
funds. Serbia will receive an indicative allocation of €622.3 million of preaccession funds. 
(For the planned allocation per sector and per year see Table A3). 
To draw a conclusion, the EU is shaping future objectives of the Western Balkan 
countries. For these countries, the enlargement and integration are processes which will bring 
European norms and standards, and make these countries reconstruct their European 
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identities with looking to the future through common perspectives. To link the Western 
Balkans with North Africa, it can be put forward that the EU is using almost the same 
strategies and policies for North African countries as well. Within two decades the EU has 
succeeded to transform the Western Balkans. As has been noted, the EU has achieved the 
targets for Western Balkans with positive outcomes. To tell the truth, the EU has put the 
North African countries in the same category as neighbour and economic partner states. 
Peaceably, with the help of the Western Balkan experience, the EU aims to strengthen the 
relations with North Africa. 
 
1.3. General Overview of the EU and North African Countries Relations 
The EU is a transnational actor and has actively intervened to the transformation process in 
North African countries in order to stabilise the region, guarantee the protection of human 
rights, encourage enhanced democracy and pluralism, strengthen the rule of law, social 
justice, moral values, European norms and standards. The EU supports these countries’ 
transition process from autocratic and repressive political regimes to democracy and welfare 
state degree. In accord with these objectives, the EU has established a partnership for 
democracy and shared prosperity with North African countries. While the EU respects 
internal transformation processes, the Union will share technical assistance and financial 
supports to governments, the European Institutions in these countries, local and regional 
authorities, political parties, foundations, trade unions and civil society organisations for 
achieving common interests, high level democracy, stability, peaceful and prosperous North 
Africa (European Commission 2011h). The EU may ensure to the North African countries the 
same solutions which the EU dealt with the Western Balkan countries in the past. 
Affirmingly, it can be put forward that the EU brings the same agenda for the North African 
countries with some minor transformations and this links the North African countries’ future 
objectives and national strategies with the case of Western Balkans in various dimensions. 
The Western Balkans ought to be seen as a step forward of the North Africa in the same way 
and in the same fate. 
Tactically, the European Union created the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 
2004 for strengthening the prosperity, stability and security both with its neighbours and 
within the EU. With the ENP, the EU established a partnership for reforms with its 
neighbours. The partnership had been much more stronger in sectoral reform and economic 
integration rather than in promoting democratisation and good governance. 
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Beside various countries, the ENP framework covers all five North African countries – 
i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Actually, the ENP is a bilateral policy; 
however, the Arab Spring awakenings have caused the enrichment of the policy focusing on 
relations at regional and multilateral level. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) 
or Association Agreements (AAs) were created for implementation of the ENP. Legally, the 
EU signed Association Agreements with five North African countries and supported each 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) of these states (European Commission 2007d; 
European Commission 2007e; European Commission 2007f; European Commission 2007g; 
European Commission 2007h). 
The aim of Association Agreements and NIPs namely are as follows: establishing 
relations based on reciprocity and partnership, the respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, political dialogue, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, 
strengthening the rule of law, control and prevention of illegal immigration, cooperation in 
the areas of corruption, support social policy, promoting private investments and job creation 
activities, upgrading economic infrastructure, non-discrimination in respect of conditions of 
work, pay and dismissal and social security provision and so on. Indubitably, the national 
indicative programme (NIP) is the Commission’s operational response for the period 2007-
2010 with an approximately €220 million indicative amount and for the period 2011-2013 
€172 million indicative amount. With respect to NIPs, the decentralisation process in these 
countries has been encouraged via EU financial supports and development assistance. For 
instance, there is a very high decentralisation trend in various industries in Algeria. The 
Algerian government intends to continue privatising some of the 1200 public enterprises 
remaining, particularly in the banking sector. According to Algeria Strategy Paper, the 
banking sector is still largely in public hands. Public banks hold more than 90 per cent of 
assets. Although the share of credit allocated to the private sector has recently risen to more 
than 60 per cent, access to credit is still difficult for businesses. 
The Algerian government will reduce state intervention in sectors where the private 
sector could take over much more effectively (i.e. land and credit markets; investment and the 
provision of business services; infrastructure; the production of goods and services that are 
neither strategic nor public goods). Indistinguishably, the EU financial assistance will 
encourage and speed up the decentralisation process in Algeria. Political situation has 
stablility and is available for welcoming private actors and foreign direct investments. For 
Egypt, the EU has approved financial allocations for financial cooperation in the years 2011-
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2013 in the sixth meeting of the EU and Egypt Association Council. The amount allocated for 
the period 2011-2013 is €449.29 million (European Commission 2010d). For Libya, the EU 
supports the National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 and the EU’s contribution to the 
Benghazi Action Plan (BAP) has amounted to €8.5 million, with a further commitment of €2 
million to follow in 2010. In 2009, the Commission announced its intention to allocate €20 
million for migration. Half of this amount was used as such: €2 million for the prevention of 
irregular migration at Libya’s southern borders; €3.5 million for the management of irregular 
migration pressures in Libya; €4.5 million for assisting the Libyan border guard and police 
and develop technical cooperation with the EU agency Frontex. For the period 2011-2013, it 
is proposed to allocate a total budget of €60 million to the National Indicative Programme for 
Libya (€30-36 million for improving the quality of human capital and €24-30 million for 
increasing the sustainability of economic and social development). For Morocco, the EU has 
approved financial allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated 
for the period 2011-2013 is €580.5 million. For Tunisia, the EU has approved financial 
allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated for the period 2011-
2013 is €240 million. Recently, for the period 2011 to 2013 the EU raised the amount 
indicatively earmarked for Tunisia from EUR 240 million to EUR 400 million (excluding 
humanitarian assistance), an increase of EUR 160 million – in excess of 60 per cent.  
Accordingly, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 2011 
– approving the special measure for Tunisia (2011) for the development support programme 
for less-developed areas was stated that the financial contribution of the EU is set at €20 
million (European Commission 2011f). 
Attentively, the European Commission has adopted the Joint Communication of 25 
May 2011 ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood which set the following priorities: 
democratic transformation and institution building, partnership with people with specific 
emphasis on support to civil society, sustainable and inclusive growth and economic 
development. In Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 
2011 was stated that ‘the provisional maximum contribution of the EU to the ‘Support for 
Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)’ programme is set at €350 million’ 
(European Commission 2011d). Conjointly, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation 
Decision of 22 December 2011 on a programme (Strengthening democratic reform in the 
southern Neighbourhood) was stated that the maximum contribution of the EU to the 
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programme is set at €4 million (European Commission 2011e) (For the comparison of EU-
supported projects see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The EU-supported Projects 
Project Title Total Cost Project 
Approach 
Components 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 
CRIS: 2011/023-078 
€22 million Direct Centralised 
Management 
-Strengthening non-state actors
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capacities and increase public 
accountability, 
-Strengthening non-state actors 
through support to regional and 
country projects, 
-Increasing involvement of non-
state actors in selected EU-partner 
countries policy dialogues 
Support for Partnership, Reforms and 
Inclusive Growth (SPRING) 
€350 
million 
Direct/Indirect 
Centralised, Joint 
Management, 
Partially 
Decentralised 
- Democratic transformation and 
institution building, and priority 
area, 
- Sustainable and inclusive growth 
and economic development 
Strengthening Democratic Reform in 
the Southern Neighbourhood 
€4 million Joint management 
with an 
international 
organisation – the 
Council of Europe 
-Enhancing the political and 
democratic 
reform processes, independence 
and efficiency of judiciary, 
-Promoting good governance and 
democratic values, 
-Strengthening and protecting 
human rights 
Source: Authors compilation of European Commission 2011k; European Commission 2011l; 
European Commission 2011m 
 
The EU supports decentralisation process in Western Balkans and North African 
countries, and in fact the EU-supported projects are accelerating this process. As is 
demonstrated in Table 1, the EU is respecting direct/indirect centralisation and joint 
management (hybridity) as well. Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2011) compared financial ratings 
of Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s for developing countries. The ratings of these 
institutions are crucial in determining the volume and cost of capital flows to developing 
countries through international bond, loan, and equity markets. According to the research, in 
Western Balkans; Albania has predicted rating range from BB to BB+ (same with Brazil; 
Colombia and El Salvador), actual rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina is B2 (May 2006, 
Moody’s) and predicted rating range differs from BB- to BB, actual ratings of Macedonia are 
BB+ (August 2005, S&P) and BB+ (December 2005, Fitch) and predicted rating range varies 
from BB to BBB-, actual ratings of Serbia and Montenegro are BB- (July 2005, S&P) and 
BB- (May 2005, Fitch), predicted rating range varies from B- to BB. The ratings for North 
                                                          
13
 Non-state actors definition provided in Article 14 of the ENPI Regulation. 
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Africa are very interestingly more positive than the ratings of Western Balkans. Bizarrely, 
despite the Arab Spring, it can be put forward that decentralisation process in North Africa 
has been supported by international financial rating institutions. For instance, for Algeria 
predicted rating range differs from A to AA (same with Chile; China and Estonia), Libya has 
the highest credit quality - predicted rating range differs from AA to AAA, for Egypt actual 
ratings are BB+ (May 2002, S&P), Ba1 (July 2001, Moody’s) and BB+ (December 2004, 
Fitch) and predicted rating range differs from BBB- to BBB, for Morocco actual ratings are 
BB+ (August 2005, S&P), Ba1 (July 1999, Moody’s) and predicted rating range differs from 
BBB- to BBB. It is assumed that decentralisation and foreign direct investment attraction are 
more likely in North Africa, whereas the Western Balkans have speculative rates which mean 
state’s authority in these countries exists. 
This point is a distinction of comparative states’ structure because North African 
countries’ migration history essentially is largely driven by a variety of reasons: notably, 
slave-trade and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation, population 
pressure and a certain cultural propensity of some ethnic groups for outward orientation 
(Kohnert 2007: 5). Externally, the dramatic conflicts in North African countries have 
attracted the attention of all neighbour countries. Unknown future of these countries is 
concerning particularly the EU because the Arab Spring movements and demonstrations have 
caused a rapid incline of migrants who are from Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. 
The framework of African migration as a whole has a great complexity. The number of 
international migrants in Africa in 2010 is estimated to be 19 million. Africa hosted just 
fewer than 9 per cent of the total global stock of migrants in 2010. Although there were 291 
million Africans living in urban areas in 2006, the OECD estimates that 1.2 billion people 
will be living in cities in Africa by 2050 (International Organisation for Migration 2010). 
Radically, the Arab Spring has shifted circulation of migrants from North African cities to 
EU cosmopolitan cities. The results of the Arab Spring are very tragic and put a huge 
question mark for the future of North African countries (European Commission 2011a: 5). 
Through its humanitarian financing and the provision of means of transport, the EU has so far 
contributed to the repatriation of approximately 50 thousand third country nationals. 
The total migrant stock in North Africa decreased between 1990 and 2005. During the 
years 2005–2010, it has reached 1.8 million migrants in 2010. Similarly, the stock of 
international migrants as a percentage of total population increased from 1.3 per cent in 2005 
to 1.4 per cent in 2010. Methodically, the EU needs to strengthen its external migration 
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policies because there is a great need for partnerships with North African countries for 
addressing the issues related to migration and mobility in a way that makes cooperation 
mutually beneficial. In developing such a policy, migration issues should be integrated into 
the overall EU's external relations to promote EU's interests and needs. In the final 
conclusions in 2011, EU leaders expressed their solidarity for member states and added that 
the bloc's border agency (Frontex) should increase its capacity through national governments 
financial support and extra money from the EU budget (Pop 2011). With centralising power 
to the EU institutions, setting up a control mechanism is indispensable and very crucial for 
measurement and effective management. Clearly, many scholars and authors underlined the 
fact that a common migration and asylum policy can shape a better controlling migration 
approach (Sørensen 2006; Castillo Curry and Sylvester 2011; Mahony 2011; Pawlak 2011; 
European Commission 2011a). The European Union has consulted with the countries of the 
region concerned on financial and technical support to improve the control and management 
of borders and measures to facilitate the return of migrants to their countries of origin. 
However, managing and contolling migration have become a problematic in terms of the 
1995 Schengen Agreement. The thousands of migrants arriving in Italy and Malta have 
highlighted the fragile trust-based nature of the Schengen Agreement that allows for passport-
free travel in 25 European countries (Mahony 2011; Pop 2011). Threateningly, the 
announcement of Denmark regarding establishment of customs checks on its borders with 
Sweden and Germany because of rising crime concerns has put the Schengen Agreement’s 
regulations in the core of the debates. In particular, the Commission wants to ensure all EU 
governments adhere to the same standards when dealing with refugees from North African 
countries. However, under current regulation, migrants should seek asylum in the country 
that was their first port of entry into the EU. On the one hand, some migrants take advantage 
of borderless travel in the EU to file asylum applications in other countries known for better 
asylum conditions. On the other hand, some of them are sent back to Italy or Greece for 
asylum application. Countries such as Greece and Italy argue others should shoulder more of 
the burden of immigration. Some states also would like to see more joint efforts in securing 
EU borders (Geddes 2005; European Commission 2011a). Aforementioned, the EU policies 
on migration and development for North African countries face many challenges that are 
similar to the case of Western Balkan migration flows. To illustrate; in the EU there are 
institutional constraints inherent that have to be overcome. The EU can provide financial aid 
and special assistance in order to prevent occurring possible conflicts in the North African 
region. Chiefly, there are also national interests of the EU countries which partly reflect 
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diverging national experiences of migration patterns. Characteristically, EU policies and 
attitudes often reflect ad hoc solutions that are the result of compromise between the interests 
of various actors both within and outside the system. 
Negatively, these solutions sometimes cause a transformation from legal migration to 
irregular migration and as a requirement for improving these issues; home countries, host 
countries and transit countries should amend legal regulations with including more specific 
statements and articles. 
Growing migration pressures in home countries led to massive flows of illegal migrants 
from many Western Balkan and North African countries. Some of these flows took on the 
form of movements of mala fide refugees, while some others took on the much more perverse 
form of human smuggling and trafficking (Bonifazi et al. 2008: 12). According to the Council 
of Europe anticipations there are over 5.5 million irregular migrants living in the European 
Union (Kourkoula 2008: 15). It is worth noting that those who enter illegally are few 
compared to those many more that arrive through regular channels, with a valid visa and then 
overstay. 
Eurostat (2011) stated that the EU countries are currently receiving large-scale migration. In 
2005, the EU had a migration flow around 1.8 million people. Effectually, the EU had to 
implement policies and take measure for these migration inflows from North African 
countries which reached very high numbers with unending conflicts of Arab Spring. The high 
migration statistics indicate the fact that capacities of the EU member states are not at 
adequate level to overcome all migration issues. Explicitly, illegal migration is becoming a 
threat for the EU in all aspects and dimensions. The North African routes
14
 must be observed 
scientifically in order to control regular migration and prevent irregular migration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 There are three broad routes: the first is from East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea), through Sudan to 
Libya. Migrants from the Horn of Africa also cross over the Gulf of Aden to Yemen (Kourkoula 2008: 94). It is 
striking that Yemen in 2006 hosted 88000 refugees from these countries. The second route is the from West and 
Central Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon) to Mali and Niger. 
The route then splits to Libya, or to Algeria and Morocco, or to Mauritania and Morocco. The third route links 
Morocco through Algeria to Libya and Tunisia, a horizontal corridor for migrants already ‘in transit’ in the 
region, who move eastwards or westwards according to rumours about where it is currently easier to cross or 
where jobs are available. 
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1.4. Country Analyses: Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria 
The 1990s Western Balkans conflict era and 2000s postconflict era may highlight many 
aspects of how to deal with chaotic migration in North African countries. Although the lack 
of reliable sources makes the research complicated, available sources present some 
similarities with Western Balkan case and therefore a comparison in this context bridges the 
practice to theory or model which will be discussed in the second chapter. 
A bilateral agreement with Libya in May 2009 substantially reduced illegal migration 
across the Straits of Sicily. While 37 thousand migrants were intercepted along the Italian 
coast in 2008, the number fell to 9.6 thousand in 2009 and to less than 3 thousand in 2010. 
The number of asylum seekers consequently fell from 31 thousand in 2008 to 17.6 thousand 
in 2009. In the first half of 2010, asylum requests fell a further 35 per cent. Despite refugees 
in Libya not being officially recognised, according to CARIM, about 18.9 thousand refugees 
and asylum seekers were in Libya in 2009. Among them, 12322 were registered with 
UNHCR, 9005 of whom were refugees and 3317 of whom were asylum seekers (CARIM 
2010). In June 2010, following a seventh round of negotiations with the EU, Libya expelled 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with whom 9 thousand 
refugees and 4 thousand asylum-seekers were registered (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011: 13). The 
number of migrants, landing in Lampedusa Island, decreased by 94 per cent between 2009 
and the first six months of 2010. According to an estimate from the Italian government, 
between 200 thousand and 300 thousand people are expected to land on European coasts in 
the near future, a figure based on the fact that 2.5 million foreign workers are currently living 
in Libya. Brussels argues for its part that the number of potential migrants lies somewhere 
between 500 thousand and 700 thousand people. During 2000-2010 according to the World 
Bank data, net migration numbers of Libya are as follows: -20300 (2000), -20300 (2005) and 
-20300 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 
11543 in 2000 to 7923 in 2010, whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin 
has slightly increased from 619 in 2000 to 2309 in 2010. There is also an incline at the 
international migration stock: 558770 (2000) approximately 11 per cent of population, 
617536 (2005) approximately 11 per cent of population and 682482 (2010) approximately 11 
per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Libya bilateral estimates of 
migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 110080 and top 
destination EU countries are the UK, Germany and Italy. 
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According to the Minister of Manpower and Migration, the number of Egyptian 
migrants reached almost 5 million individuals in 2010. The Egyptian government after the 25 
January 2011 revolution has encouraged the migration of Egyptians abroad, in order to lower 
unemployment, and to increase remittances (Sika 2011). During 2000-2010 according to the 
World Bank data, net migration numbers of Egypt are as follows: -945704 (2000), -370780 
(2005) and -346922 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has slightly 
increased from 6840 in 2000 to 95056 in 2010, and refugee population by country or territory 
of origin has increased from 3953 in 2000 to 6913 in 2010. There is also an incline between 
2000-2005 and drop between 2005-2010 at the international migration stock: 169149 (2000) 
approximately 0.25 per cent of population, 246745 (2005) approximately 0.3 per cent of 
population and 244714 (2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see Table A4). 
According to World Bank Egypt bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number 
of migrants in host countries is 3741055 and top destination EU country is Italy. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Algeria 
are as follows: -140000 (2000), -140000 (2005) and -140000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 169656 in 2000 to 94144 in 2010, and  
refugee population by country or territory of origin has decreased from 8034 in 2000 to 6689 
in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 250110 (2000) 
approximately 0.8 per cent of population, 242446 (2005) approximately 0.7 per cent of 
population and 242324 (2010) approximately 0.7 per cent of population (see Table A4). 
According to World Bank Algeria bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total 
number of migrants in host countries is 1211118 and top destination EU countries are France, 
Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of 
Morocco are as follows: -500000 (2000), -614000 (2005) and -675000 (2010). Refugee 
population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 2105 in 2000 to 792 in 2010, 
whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin has slightly increased from 392 
in 2000 to 2284 in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 53124 
(2000) approximately 0.2 per cent of population, 51020 (2005) approximately 0.2 per cent of 
population and 49098 (2010) approximately 0.15 per cent of population (see Table A4). 
According to World Bank Morocco bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total 
number of migrants in host countries is 3016631 and top destination EU countries are France, 
Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. 
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During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Tunisia 
are as follows: -55624 (2000), -80599 (2005) and -20000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 436 in 2000 to 89 in 2010, whereas refugee 
population by country or territory of origin has increased from 1207 in 2000 to 2174 in 2010. 
There is a decline at the international migration stock: 36221 (2000) approximately 0.4 per 
cent of population, 34881 (2005) approximately 0.35 per cent of population and 33591 
(2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank 
Tunisia bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host 
countries is 651737 and top destination EU countries are France, Italy, Germany and 
Belgium. 
Fundamentally, migration flows from North Africa to the EU have also economic 
consequences and dimensions. In Algeria, there is frequently an increase at inward remittance 
flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $1.75 billion, and in 2009 the inward 
remittance flows reached $2.06 billion. In Egypt, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is 
$2.96 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $7.15 billion. Anew, in 2003, 
the outward remittance flows is $79 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows 
reached $255 million. Incrementally, in Libya, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $8 
million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $14 million. Whereas, in 2003, the 
outward remittance flows is $676 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached 
$1 billion. Similarly, working remittances have increased from $644 million in 2003 to $964 
million in 2008. In Morocco, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $3.6 billion, and in 2009 
the inward remittance flows reached $6.27 billion. There is an incline at outward remittance 
flows from $44 million in 2003 to $61 million in 2009. In Tunisia, in 2003, the inward 
remittance flows is $1.25 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $1.96 
billion. In contrast with inward remittances, there is a decline at outward remittance flows 
from $17 million in 2003 to $13 million in 2009. 
In terms of Feminisation of migration, the empirical results highlight the fact that a high 
percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Algeria, 45.2 per cent, in Egypt 46.6 
per cent, in Libya 35.5 per cent and in Morocco 49.7 per cent, in Tunisia 49.3 per cent of 
immigrants are females. 
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1.5. Data Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries 
The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkans and North African countries are as 
follows: Libya has the highest international migration stock and thus the highest percentage 
of population in North Africa. In the same manner, in Western Balkans, Serbia has the 
highest international migration stock and percentage of population. In North Africa, Egypt, 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia follow Libya with high level of migration stock. However, 
Tunisia and Algeria have higher percentage of population of international migration stock 
than Egypt. Juxtaposedly, in Western Balkans, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of 
population of international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are 
relatively high despite the fact that these countries have a low population rate comparing with 
Serbia (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
 
Figure 1: International Migration Stock Comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
Countries 
 
Symptomatically, the results of the comparison of percentage of population of the stock 
of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and percentage of population of the stock 
of immigrants of Western Balkans and North African countries are as such: In North Africa,  
Libya has the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants. Morocco has the 
highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants and females as percentage of 
immigrants. Commensurably, in Western Balkans, Montenegro has the highest percentage of 
population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. Exclusively, 
Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants (For numerical 
comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Population of the Stock of Immigrants, Emigrants and Females as 
Percentage of Immigrants 
 
According to the World Bank bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host 
countries, in North Africa, Libya has the highest number of migrant stock at home country 
and Egypt has the highest number of migrant stock at host country. In Western Balkans, 
Albania has the highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock at host country (For numerical 
comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
Figure 3: Bilateral Estimates of Migration Stock at Home and Host Country 
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Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkans and North 
African countries, both two graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For example, in North Africa, 
Egypt and Morocco have slightly increasing trend at inward remittance flows, and Libya has 
the lowest level of inward remittance flows and the highest amount of outward remittance 
flows. Similarly, in Western Balkans, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of 
inward and outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance 
flows (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
 
Figure 4: Inward and Outward Remittance Flows Comparison of Western Balkan and North 
African Countries 
 
The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum
15
 of Western Balkans and North African countries indicates interesting results. In 
North Africa, Egypt and Algeria have the highest refugee population, whereas Tunisia has the 
lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum (see Figure 5). In Western 
Balkans, Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has 
the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum (For numerical comparisons 
see Table A2 and A4). 
                                                          
15
 Country of asylum is the country where an asylum claim was filed and granted. 
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Figure 5: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum 
 
The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of 
origin
16
 of Western Balkans and North African countries emphasizes the fact that the 
Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of 
origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee 
population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest refugee population by country or 
territory of origin (see Figure 6). In North Africa, Algeria and Egypt have the highest refugee 
population level, whereas Libya has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of 
origin (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
                                                          
16
 Country of origin generally refers to the nationality or country of citizenship of a claimant. 
Albania
Algeria
BosniaHerzegovina
Egypt
Libya
M acedonia
M ontenegro
M orocco
Serbia
T unisia
country
Bars show M odes
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
year
17
56
76
89
93
99
193
436
766
792
1240
1542
2105
2760
4363
6926
7230
7923
9050
11543
11897
22215
24741
38152
86351
88946
94101
94180
96739
97995
169033
169422
291403
484391
R
e
fu
g
e
e
 P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum
Compar ison o f Western Balkans and Nor th  Afr ican Countries
37 
 
Figure 6: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin 
With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may acknowledge many similarities 
among Western Balkans and North African countries when they especially focus on concepts 
such as inward and outward remittance flows, refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries and so forth. The 
crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the generalisation of 
concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and 
differences. 
Table 2: The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkans and North African Countries 
North African 
Countries 
National Indicative 
Programmes for North 
Africa 
Western Balkan Countries Multiannual 
Indicative Financial 
Framework 
Algeria* (20011-2013) €172 million  Albania (2011-2013) €228.82 
Egypt (2011-2013) €449.29 million BiH (2011-2013) €328.7 
Libya (2011-2013) €60 million Kosovo (2011-2013) €212.4 
Morocco (2011-2013) €580.5 million Macedonia (2011-2013) €320.3 
Tunisia (2011-2013) €400 million Montenegro (2011-2013) €104.9 
*(2007-2010) €220 million  Serbia (2011-2013) €622.3 
Total Amount €1.66 billion Total Amount €1.81 billion 
Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit 
higher than the sum of approved financial allocations for NIPs of North African countries. 
More importantly, when the allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans 
total population: 18.66 million; North African countries total population: 166.7 million), to be 
sure at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans can be understood precisely. 
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1.6. Linking Comparative Analyses with Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
Grounded theory covers the nexuses among the concepts and/or categories, the data and the 
theory. The categories ought to be grounded in the data in order to shape theory or model. 
Systematically, the study has presented the cases of Western Balkans and North African 
countries data to form conceptual categories. The interrelationship among concepts and 
categories was illustrated as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Interrelationships Among Concepts and Categories of Comparison Analyses 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
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The first step of controlling migration approach is visa applications. Many embassies of 
EU member states in Western Balkans and North African countries have set up new 
regulations and procedures so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot 
obtain a valid visa because of not meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of 
visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards migrants and gives a clue 
regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and procedures. If 
migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even 
though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa 
application process, many inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or 
different problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are 
the most dynamic factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and their 
families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts points out another 
issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even public 
institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host countries 
because of several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living 
in between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial problems are 
problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, hybridity which will 
be argued in the second section proposes a solution which links home and host country with 
public and private actors, and migrants with civil society. 
The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, 
asylum seekers from Western Balkans and North African countries temporarily find solutions 
for working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries, the 
high level of competitiveness, restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are 
the essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. However, 
these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of home country 
and make the host country change the positive attitude towards asylum seekers. In fact, the 
main reason of negative behaviours of asylum seekers is the lack of information sources. 
Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online platforms for asylum 
seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home 
and host countries. 
The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category 
frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model 
will provide strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of migration 
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dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil society in terms of 
pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via indirect centralisation 
within public sphere and state’s authority to attain the ultimate goal, i.e. the transition to the 
controlling migration approach. This will be a reflection of global trends because on the one 
side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled workers and well-
educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is shaped by migrants of 
Western Balkans and North African countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving 
unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will strengthen the partnership level among 
home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions for issues such as pensions, 
bargaining, social dialogue, social protection and inclusion, healthcare, job creations, 
capacity building and so on. 
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2 Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
The research paper has initially presented empirical evidences of Western Balkans and North 
African countries’ migration flows to the EU. Basically, giving a general overview of these 
countries migration data helps us to construct controlling migration and hybrid model on the 
ground of these data. Of course, data must be clarified with all aspects, dimesions and details. 
However, the main purpose of this paper is to open a debate regarding the usage of hybrid 
model in migration research. 
If scientists consider research as an archaeological excavation, they might acknowledge 
the fact that there is a huge difference among the starting point of the research and finalising 
process of the research because nobody knows what the research outcomes will bring and in 
which theoretical angle will they fit in and/or which missing knowledge will they fill in. First 
of all, conceptually, some misusages and misunderstandings concerning with controlling 
migration and hybrid model need corrections. It is better to distinguish hybrid model as 
general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model. General/real hybrid model covers 
state and non-state actors (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: General/Real Hybrid Model 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
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(e.g. government, municipality and so on) and non-state actors (e.g. civil society, private, 
cooperatives, trade unions, works councils, NGOs, lobby groups, diasporas, universities, 
churches and religious associations and communities, epistemic communities, the media and 
so forth) within the confine of state’s control mechanism. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Specific/Ideal Hybrid Model 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
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Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or 
strategic efforts of state, private actors and non-profit organisations. Anheier (1991) 
examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the relation between the public sphere 
and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is institutionally 
embedded between state and society and located among the decentralised public sector and 
the centralising tendencies in civic society. He scientifically framed a liberal democratic 
image of a public sphere and stressed that the emergence of values, conflicts and new 
subjects of public discourse do not take place in the official public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) but 
in the counterpublic spheres or alternative spheres (Gegenöffentlichkeiten). In this respect, the 
third sector which essentially has characteristics of heterogenity and pluralism rather than 
homogenity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in between public and private 
dichotomy (Anheier and Seibel 1990; Anheier and Toepler 1999). Accordingly, intermediary 
zone between the state and the market covers an ambivalent political atmosphere, a political 
economy of interest mediation and organisational sociology. Thus, hybridity as appeared in 
sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations with difficulties that occur 
among Government Organisations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organisations (NPOs) and 
Private Market Organisations (PMOs). 
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was 
argued by many remarkable scientists, politicians and authors (Lawrence 1988; Giddens 
1998; Blair 1998; Giddens 2000; Etzioni 2000; and Jordan 2010). The third way has various 
meanings such as ‘new progressivism’ for the American Democrats, ‘new labour’ for the 
Labour Party in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a left-right rationalisation, political 
environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernising left or modernising social democracy as 
Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of 
Giddens. What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model 
seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and 
civil society from a broader perspective. Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political 
doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, the third 
way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains how the ideal 
policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it provides solutions 
in real terms. Giddens created a triange which can be accepted in the context of general/real 
hybrid model, i.e. finance, manufacture and knowledge (Giddens 2000: 72-3). He emphasized 
the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of productivity and expanding financial 
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markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening foundations of 
knowledge base society. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through 
looking to international financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered 
the third way as failure because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and 
social relations (Jordan 2010). Jordan included the big ‘conservative’ society thesis which is a 
recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the third way approach, big society 
idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position and active 
participation of churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralisation 
process from central government to local governments and then enforces religious institutions 
at local level. The hybrid model that this study argues is something more than this picture. 
Ideally, hybridity looks into various communities, associations, unions and organisations to 
form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big 
society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, the role and influence 
of churches at increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are indispensable 
however not at adequate level for dealing with social issues. 
The famous German social scientist Jürgen Habermas involved to hybridity debate 
however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership and central authority of state. 
Literally, he denoted that ‘the fundamental rights had to become effective for offering as 
positive guarantees for participation with equal opportunity in the process of the production 
of social wealth, as well as that of the formation of public opinion. In the interplay of a 
commercial society the granting of equal opportunity in participating in social rewards (by 
way of the market) and in participating in the political institutions (as part of the general 
public) was to be attained only indirectly by means of guaranteeing freedom and security vis-
à-vis the power concentrated in the state. A triple function of the fundamental rights is also 
legitimised by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be 
maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organisation’ (Habermas 
1988: 115-7). 
Naively, Habermas preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society 
from Marxist point of view, rather investigating more specifically the ideal hybrid model. 
Nevertheless, remarkable scientists like Habermas put forward argumentations that take into 
account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. With respect to this great 
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transformation
17
, multilateralism, regionalisation and multipolarity caused emerging of new 
regional powers in the world. Monopol powers are by inches oligopolised and this situation 
has balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international 
and transnational level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. 
Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has prepared a base for 
the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises 
(SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridisation via national private 
actors in modern nation states (Aliu 2012). Hybridity has various dimensions; such as 
political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in 
political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities
18
), judicial hybridity (e.g. 
hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 
26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach19) and so forth. 
According to the mode of institutionalisation, there are three types of governance; 
‘governance by governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without 
governments’. 
 
Table 3: Governance by/with/without Government(s) 
 
Type of Governance 
Mode of 
Institutionalisation 
Norm Building Norm Implementing 
Governance by 
government(s) 
International/governmental 
cooperation 
Without self-organisation Via nation-states 
Governance with 
government(s) 
Global policy networks With self-organisation With nation-states 
Governance without 
government(s) 
Transnational network 
organisations 
Via self-organisation Without nation-states 
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27 
Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalisation 
and how norms are built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states 
                                                          
17
 I refer to the terminology of Karl Polanyi. In his book – the Great Transformation – which was a magnum 
opus, he argued how capitalism was disembedded. 
18
 Migrants in host communities find themselves challenged because of the continuity and boundaries of the 
past. The process of belonging involves imagined communities and communities of practice for migrants and 
host communities. Therefore, this situation shapes migrants with hybrid identities between home and host 
countries (Babacan and Singh 2010). Papastergiadis entered to the hybrid identity debate with linking identity, 
culture and community with deterritorialisation, globalisation and hybridity (Blunt and Mary 2001; 
Hatziprokopiou 2002). From his analyses, it can be put forward that Western Balkans and North African 
countries’ citizens have hybrid identities. 
19
 Charles Darwin added Chapter IX (i.e. ‘Hybridism’ which means the infertility of species and the fertility of 
varieties when intercrossed) to his well-known book ‘The Origin of Species.’ It is diametrically impressive that 
Darwin used the terms hybridism and hybrids 171 times in the text. 
HYBRID 
MODEL 
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are presented by their own governments. The governments of states can create international 
global relations with other sovereign states or international organisations. This type of 
governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only at nation-state level. 
Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organisation. Governance 
with governments means among others also governments take place, however there are also 
non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid 
structures in which these actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common 
objectives. Hybrid model is typically related to governance with governments because public 
actors, private actors and civil society actors share common interests and these interests are 
quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors hybrid model means 
centralised authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For 
private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil 
society hybrid model means having a mainstream role among state and private and transform 
interests in favour of the goodness of society. 
With hybrid model, states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in 
which they do not act on the basis of sovereignty, but of equal order, and at least of the 
plurality of opinion development processes. This is the reason why many cases of hybrid 
development situated among that which is categorised as sovereign within the state and that 
which is categorised as pertaining to private law (Mückenberger 2008: 28). Scientifically, 
distinguishing these cases is very complicated because these can become an amalgam which 
is not only a part of private law but also it is a part of public law. Hence, the question which 
should be raised is how can be explained voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and 
legitimacy – effectiveness on the other in the context of hybrid complex structures? This 
question poses the legitimacy issue among state and non-state actors and the increasing 
legitimacy power of transnational non-state actors within the nation-state’ sovereignty. 
Objectively, Hudson discussed this challenge that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors 
influence deeply the inter-state system’s monopoly of authority. ‘Some commentators 
assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as sovereignty-free actors link up and 
operate across state borders as part of transnational networks’ (Hudson 2001: 334). We can 
assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central 
authority, sovereignty, decentralisation and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency 
towards theoretical complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the 
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multidimensional and multicausal nature of current world politics (Dingwerth and Pattberg 
2006: 200). 
In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition 
for social transformation and indirect centralisation. As an illustration, migration and asylum 
issues acquire elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away 
from the nation-state with the assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels (Dijstelbloem 
and Meijer 2011: 35). On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other 
hand, this shift of power causes decentralisation in nation state structure. Central power of 
Brussels’ governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers under the control of the EU institutions. 
The European Commission has created at implementing decision on a special measure 
which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping 
non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor reform and their role 
in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Communication proposes the 
establishment of a ‘Civil Society Facility’ to provide funding for non-state actors. The 
objective of the Facility is to strengthen and promote the role of non-state actors in reforms 
and democratic transformations through increased participation in the fulfilment of 
Neighbourhood Policy objectives (European Commission 2011c: 1).  Naturally, civil society 
has a crucial role in advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for 
minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU Delegetions 
aim to bring partner countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured 
dialogue (European Commission 2011g). Latterly, the EU has established a structured 
dialogue strategic process aimed at defining and agreeing on the roles of civil society and 
local authorities in development, improving the effectiveness of their involvement in aid 
activities and exploring ways to adapt EU aid modalities to increase the impact of its 
development programmes. 
Considering clarifications above, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within 
state structure at national level or within the EU structure at supranational level controlling 
migration is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state 
and non-state parts with taking into account ‘migration driving forces’ (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1995) such as remittances, labour policy (wages, employment and so forth), 
economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. 
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Combining migration driving forces with controlling mechanisms supports shaping a 
controlling migration approach. At this point it is significant to present elements and factors 
of the controlling migration mechanisms that were included in the UK five year strategy for 
asylum and immigration report (2005). According to the report, the challenge for the UK 
government is to maintain public confidence in the system by agreeing immigration where it 
is in the country’s interests and preventing it where it is not. This distinction is really difficult 
because national policies and strategies should be adjustable and in favour of the 
supranational and international migration law. The UK government have set up several 
migration regulations such as: establishing on-the-spot fines for employers who collude with 
illegal immigration, fingerprinting visitors who need visas, and those planning longer stays 
before their arrivals, demanding financial bonds from migrants in specific categories where 
there has been evidence of abuse in order to guarantee their return home, replacing out-dated 
and confusing rules with a clear and modern points system and so forth. 
Controlling migration is not possible with using only hard law of states towards 
migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause 
an incline at illegal migration flows. Fondly, it ought to be noted that preventing illegal 
migration covers alternative patterns that are in favour of migrants. The attempts to control 
the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase in the number of illegal 
migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. 
While analysing the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration report, several 
crucial points have attracted our attention. From a third way approach perspective, soft power 
of the state with proactive applications was seen as a better option for dealing with migration 
issues. Additionally, the report was attempted to present concrete solutions that minimise 
potential problems through using fingerprinting and preboarding electronic checks, requiring 
from migrants staying in UK for more than three months to have an ID card, screening visa 
applicants for tuberculosis on high risk routes, expanding the network of Airline Liaison 
Officers, demanding financial bonds from migrants, detaining more failed asylum seekers, 
introducing fast track processing of all unfounded asylum seekers, with greater control over 
applicants throughout the process, preventing applicants concealing their identity to frustate 
removal, working with countries which generate the most failed asylum seekers to ensure that 
they redocument and accept back failed asylum seekers, and expanding voluntary returns 
schemes, maximising returns to safe countries and finding ways to return unaccompanied 
asylum seeking children. Gently, in the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration 
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report, ‘gate-keeping strategy’ (Triandafyllidou 2010) was preferred to be followed instead of 
fencing strategy. Triandafyllidou compared these two strategies as such: gate-keeping 
strategies (i.e. paper controls) aim at restricting practical legal access to a nation and its 
institutions, and fencing strategy which measures (i.e. detecting persons) actively target 
illegal migrants in order to arrest and then expel them. Latterly, as a gate-keeping strategy, 
most of Western European states adopted tests and language courses as official precondition 
for immigration. This means mandatory language and country knowledge as precondition for 
immigration represent effective instrument for immigration control (Goodman 2011: 235). 
Controlling migration is an open debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general 
theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable. Hypothetically, researchers can make 
significant progress by reembedding migration research in a more general understanding of 
contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of 
social scientific disciplines (Castles 2010: 1565). Therefore, I have attempted to illustrate the 
nexus among controlling migration and hybridity in migration research. 
Reasoning hybridity in the context of controlling migration gives some clues to deal 
with forced migration. Betts (2009) came in the edge of the hybrid model, however he has 
formulated ideal type relationship as state, citizen and territory. Betts compared forced 
migration with international theories such as: neorealism, liberal institutionalism, analytical 
liberalism, the English School, constructivism and critical theory. In this framework, the 
hybrid model best fits in constructivist approach which explores the role of non-state actors 
and transnational actors in world politics. 
Esping-Andersen argues that the state, the market economy and the family – a 
community archetype – are the three basic welfare pillars of society (Evers 2005). Inevitably, 
Esping-Andersen stated that welfare states’ labour markets are embedded in the institutional 
framework of social policy. ‘Welfare state and employment regimes not only coincide, but 
also that welfare states indeed have a direct causal impact on how employment structures and 
new axes of social conflict evolve’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). While investigating state-
employment relationship, Esping-Andersen introduced a third way, an alternative strategy. A 
politics of collectivising families’ needs (de-familialisation) frees women from unpaid labour, 
and thereby nurtures the dual-earner household. A social democratic defamilialisation 
strategy can reverse fertility decline if it helps employed mothers square the caring work 
circle and if it is willing to cover a good part of the opportunity costs of having children. A 
fundamental postindustrial dilemma is that families seem no longer inclined to assume the 
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costs of bearing children. Humanistically, the double-earner household plays the role of 
employment multiplier and the employment multiplier of working mothers can be quite 
substantial (Esping-Andersen 1999). From this standpoint, I should like to remind the impact 
of migration on female migrants. As it is argued above, in the Western Balkans and North 
African states, female migrants are increasingly leaving their country of origins because of 
several reasons. Actually, Esping-Andersen’s defamilialisation strategy may help for the 
feminisation of migration. However, to improve theoretical concepts researching practical 
reasons is needed. As a consequence, hybrid structures lay behind Esping-Andersen’s 
understanding and arguments which have implications of the impact of what is labeled as 
state, community and societal or market-principles. 
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a 
practical intention. He proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships 
of the theory’s own origins and application. He classified three aspects of the relation 
between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, and methodological aspects 
(Habermas 1988: 1-3). Excellently, Habermas stated that: 
The dictum on the ex post facto character of theory determines its relation to praxis. Political theory 
cannot aim at instructing the state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral 
universal – should be known (Habermas, 1988: 178-179). Therefore, a convergence of the two systems 
(the third way) on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the welfare state is not to be 
excluded. If indeed the old Utopias of the best possible social order and eternal peace, the highest degree 
of freedom and perfect happiness, contain the underlying rational themes of a theory, no matter how 
distorted into a derivative myth, as their implicit basis; and then praxis must legitimate itself in terms of 
this theory, because it has now been invested with the mantle of a state ideology (Habermas, 1988: 197-
198). 
In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure 
how hybridity may work in EU, Western Balkans and North African countries. The first 
example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The author of this article carried out an 
in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & 
Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which 
is a common platform for state, private and civil society. It has been established this month 
(April, 2012) and the main purpose is to include other non-state actors to this platform in 
order to deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs and many other issues which 
are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened 
me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and 
volunteers who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has 
the potential to create a transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid 
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project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project’s motto that is ‘problems are potentials.’ 
This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and each actor has 
its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will be 
transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralisation 
and social transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness 
and solidarity are three principles of this harmony. Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that ‘if 
you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house (He referred to an 
African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently preparing a similar hybrid project for 
Western Balkan countries’ institutions for benchmarking, embedding and proliferating 
hybridity. 
The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve 
Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration 
of Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a 
hybrid network of young people at home country and host country. ASAN project 
participants have created an online database (www.asan.al) and rapidly increased capacity of 
the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with 
internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real 
hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level 
and incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, 
objectives of the project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and energy of 
young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation and coordination 
of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; establish a 
national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for Albanian 
migrants; increase Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors 
in a common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and 
unify Albanian youth with their diversities. 
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2.1. Dialectics of Triple Win and Hybrid Model 
First of all, many scholars argued triple win solutions in the context of circular migration, i.e. 
dynamic mobility of migrants among home countries and host countries (Vertovec 2004; 
Zimmermann 2005; Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani 2006; Vertovec 2007; Erzan 2008; Haas 
2010). Haas argued that circular migration brings positive impact for development when 
home country, host country and migrants are organised through cooperation (Haas 2010). 
Actually, this cooperation is a combination of triple win and hybridity. Despite the fact that 
state-private-civil society interactions are part of a long debate, interestingly, many scholars 
have not recognised this fact yet. Historically, in the past, first Thomas More versus Niccolo 
Machiavelli had started debating on the role of the state, then this tradition was continued 
with Karl Marx versus Adam Smith with liberal-communist perspectives, the last scientific 
duello of this tradition was between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls – arguing whether a 
social or liberal theory of justice in ideal (Kantian) or real (Hobbesian) terms will be in 
favour of goodness of society. In fact, all these scientists – including the scientists of Chicago 
and Frankfurt Schools – were not opposing to the role of all non-state actors. 
Mainly, constructing hybridity with taking into consideration these debates will shape 
hybrid model as a paradigm (in Kuhn’s terminology). Apel (2011) argued that researchers 
should start to their investigations not only with specific paradigms but also with the 
paradigms of the first philosophy that have ontological, epistemological, hermeneutic and 
phenomenological perspectives. Apel goes beyond to scientific revolutions and looks to the 
reasons with very deep research questions. Neutrally, my proposal is to use hybrid model as a 
paradigm. From triple win point of view, social scientists should strongly criticise and contest 
the researches which are focusing only on host countries’ self-interest maximisation without 
embedding hybridity. Ethically, a strategic home and host country partnership which does not 
take into account migrants’ interests should be contested as well. This study goes one step 
further and attempts to enhance the triple win solutions for three sides of hybrid model. 
Mentally, there are interrelationships and dialectics among triple win model (home 
country, host country and migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home country nexus, private-
host country nexus and migrants-civil society nexus. If there are interrelationships and 
dialectics among six sides, then the researchers ought to seek an ideal six-sided win approach. 
Figure 9 indicates a specific/ideal hybrid model which includes many non-state actors. From 
this understanding, when a researcher puts home and host country in a zero-sum game 
approach, of course a special focus would be reciprocal interaction among state actors. 
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However, many non-state actors exist in both home and host countries. Social scientists may 
find a solution which balances or maximises national interests of home and host countries, 
migrants, and more importantly non-state actors in both home and host countries. Probably, a 
distinction of two things may clarify better migrants integration problems within societies of 
both home and host countries. First, researchers who examine ideal triple win solutions, 
mostly analyse state-centric migration issues. A recent debate in some of Western Balkan 
countries was regarding pensions. The issue has a high level complexity because it has been 
handled from state-centric, and bilateral dimensions. For example, rather how trade unions 
are coordinated within home and host countries separately, the crucial point is how the 
hybridisation of trade unions as non-state actors within home and host countries can solve 
labour migration-related problems. I would like to call this linkage ‘interhybridity’ that may 
exist in states which reciprocally acts in terms of interhybridity. 
Indisputably, hybrid model has a catalyst (katalysator) role in terms of balancing social 
problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model 
as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition 
within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social relations 
with moral meanings of communication. 
Habermas classified social actions as instrumental, symbolic, communicative and 
strategic actions (Habermas 1979: 40). In the ambiguity of hybrid model, communicative 
action and strategic action require more attention. Habermas describes communicative action 
as ‘oriented to reaching understanding’, whereas strategic action as ‘oriented to the actor’s 
success.’ He distinguished strategic action from communicative action with taking into 
account Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and discourse ethics in terms of 
cognitivism, universalism and formalism (Habermas 1990). He defined that ‘communicative 
action is oriented to observing intersubjectively valid norms that link reciprocal expectations 
(recognition). In communicative action, the validity basis of speech is presupposed. The 
universal validity claims which participants at least implicitly raise and reciprocally 
recognise, make possible the consensus that carries action in common. Whereas, in strategic 
action, according to Habermas this background consensus is lacking. Strategic action remains 
indifferent with respect to its motivational conditions, whereas the consensual 
presuppositions of communicative action can secure motivations’. Thus, strategic actions 
must be institutionalised, that is embed in intersubjectively binding norms that guarantee the 
fulfilment of the motivational conditions (Habermas 1979: 118). 
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Giddens supported Habermas’ communicative action theory. To achieve a  better 
theory-practice nexus, Giddens created the theory of structuration which is an interaction of 
objectivism (Marx) and subjectivism (Weber). Giddens argued that from ontological point of 
view, structuration theory means ‘a conceptual investigation of the nature of human action, 
social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions’ (Giddens 1991: 201). 
In structuration theory, the core concern of the social sciences is with recurrent social 
practices and their transformations. Theoretically, structuration theory offers a conceptual 
action that allows one to understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of 
social systems yet created by them. Broadwise, structuration theory can be a guide for a 
specific/ideal hybrid model. 
With well-structured specific/ideal hybrid models which will be embedded in migration 
research, integration and development issues will meet concrete solutions because in a huge 
platform in a networked hybrid society each state and non-state actors will communicate and 
debate reciprocally and respectfully. 
To attain ideal integration and better results, more efforts are needed both at the EU, the 
national and local level (European Commission 2011a: 13). Integration requires efforts by the 
migrant and the receiving society. Migrants must be given the opportunity to participate in 
their new communities, in particular to learn the language of the receiving country, to have 
access to employment, education and health systems, as well as to have the socio-economic 
capacity. Migrants' integration implies a balance between enjoying the rights and respecting 
the laws and cultures of the host countries. Justly, the human dimension of migration and 
development policies will also be strengthened through the introduction of a migrant-based 
approach. Indivisiby, the role of diaspora should get more attention. Initiatives geared to 
enabling members of the diaspora to contribute to their country of origin should be 
considered, including the promotion of the temporary return of qualified migrants. Building 
upon the first positive experiences, the possibilities of circular migration need to be further 
developed (European Commission 2011a). The European Parliament also underlined in its 
recent Resolution (i.e. European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows 
arising from instability: scope and role of EU foreign policy) the need to have a balanced and 
comprehensive approach. Certainly, a specific/ideal hybrid model can be an active, 
comprehensive and rational strategy and/or policy recommendation for stabilisation and 
development in Western Balkans and North African countries. 
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Circular migration from Western Balkans and North African countries to the EU 
member states poses the question that is ‘Does migration encourage development of the 
countries of origin or hider such development? Does migration cause brain gain and/or brain 
drain at home countries? (Castles and Miller 2009). What about this question: From 
postcolonialism point of view, does migration improve relations among postcolonial home 
country and postcoloniser host country? I raise this question because both Western Balkans 
and North Africa were colonies of European states in the past under various civilisations’ 
hegemony and hence postcolonial era brought rapid development to these regions and linked 
cultural similarities with Europe. In this context, implications of the Mahoney’s investigation 
are threefold. First, by bringing coloniser institutions back into the picture, it is possible to 
clarify disagreements about the relationship between precolonial population size and colonial 
settlement. Second, attention to coloniser differences sheds new light on debates about 
whether or not colonial settlers preferred to inhabit low-morality environments. Third, a 
concern with coloniser identity helps make sense of over time differences in the way natural 
resource endowments historically shaped levels of colonisation (Mahoney 2010: 264-265). 
The argument of Mahoney’s work highlights how colonial countries were influenced 
negatively by colonisers during the colonial period and then how this understanding has been 
changed. Because post-colonial countries are affected positively by their former colonisers 
during the modern era. Mahoney perfectly explains this shift with Japan case. 
In developing countries, effective participation in the world economy has occurred largely only when the 
state actively stimulates and directs – and perhaps even creates do novo – commercial and 
entrepreneurial classes. This state role bears little resemblance to either the ideal typical mercantilist or 
liberal capitalist political economies. The new ‘developmental states’ are, instead founded on an active 
partnership between the state and private capital, one in which state actors enjoy relative autonomy from 
entrepreneurial classes even as they are deeply tied to those classes through social networks. This kind of 
state-society model, which perhaps has Japan as its exemplar, has proven most effective at achieving 
sustained high growth since the late nineteenth century. It was, in fact, Japan that endowed its two most 
important and heavily settled colonial possessions – Korea and Taiwan – with institutions and actors 
congruent with a developmental state and a state-led industrial model. Korea and Taiwan are the 
postcolonial countries that have most impressively risen towards the top of the world economic hierarchy 
since the mid-twentieth century (Mahoney 2010: 268). 
In like a manner, development process in post-colonial India can be perceived in the 
same way precisely. The UK supported the Indian elite class inside the country and all around 
the world in order to accelerate the development process during post-colonial era. Fludernik 
(1998) edited a book which is entitled ‘Hybridity and Postcolonialism’ and her work 
examines how the UK influenced Indian society with the cultural power and value of English 
language (Spanish, French, German, Albanian and other languages have influential cultural 
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power as well)
20
. She explained evidences through looking to the Indian literature. Thus, if 
English as an element of the communicative action has the power to shape a hybrid culture in 
societies, then other elements of communicative action such as media and family may have 
the power to shape hybridity in terms of cultural aspects as well. Cultural hybridity also have 
a significant effect on both general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model. 
As a consequence, it is apparent that Western Balkans has been put to a pro-European 
position from cultural and economic aspects. The EU has stressed at the progress reports, 
media channels, and even at academic level that the Western Balkans belongs to European 
culture, history and tradition. However, the North African countries are somehow still 
categorised as ‘pure orientalist states’ (Said 1978). Nevertheless, it can be claimed that both 
of these regions share similar characteristics of orientalism as a catastrophic result of the past 
imperialist experiences. As an instance, in North Africa, French imperial strategies (e.g. 
mission civilisatrice) shaped a general understanding of orientalism. From classical master-
slave dialectic, colonisers actually did not govern colonies in the past, they merely governed 
the governors of colonies. However, in post-colonial era, hybrid governance will civilise 
governance approaches and attain ontological stability. 
Undoubtedly, culture is a great source for shaping identities and belonging feelings. In 
postcolonial era, migrants are returning to their own cultures and traditions. Obviously, as 
Said (1993) pointed out these returns accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral 
behaviour that are opposed to the permissiveness associated with multiculturalism and 
hybridity. In a world where the number of migrants are reaching a greater amount, it is not 
possible to consider a culture as single, pure, homogenous, autonomous or monolithic 
because hybridity is an indispensable and revolutionary transformation process. I have been 
conscious that Said’s arguments are the best responses to the Mahoney’s post-colonial 
‘picture.’ 
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in 
post-soviet bloc Western Balkan countries and post-colonial North African countries. The 
specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role of states and 
the existence of centralised power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. 
                                                          
20
 Young (1995) investigated hybridity in a comprehensive scope with cultural and racial aspects. The core point 
is that past colonial experiences shaped differentiated and quasi-assimilated identities. Thus the interaction and 
confrontation of these identities with present world order might pose a question – i.e. How these mixtures of 
cultures and identities will communicate with each other within societies? That would exactly mean (quasi) 
cultural hybrid forms (e.g. amalgamation and miscegenation) are likely to proliferate and this expansion will 
accumulate various common dimensions in diversified entirety of variations of hybridity. 
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Second, people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to be 
included in communicative action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, 
national interests and values towards inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as 
actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial era. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective 
strategy for social transformation of controlling migration approach. 
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Conclusion 
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration (Castles and Miller 2009) 
requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. Hegel’s dialectic method might be 
applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better outcomes. For instance, 
Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real “Alles was 
wirklich ist, ist vernunftig, und alles was vernunftig ist, ist wirklich”(Hegel 1899).’ As a 
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a 
proactive vision and transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Controlling 
migration by an ideal hybrid structure and indirect centralisation will create more efficient 
and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, 
hybrid structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With 
indirect centralisation within the context of state’s authority and public sphere, these 
structures will have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus 
EU may improve its common migration and asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, 
empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral consciousness in 
migration turbulence (particularly for the Arab Spring migration flows) through controlling 
mechanisms and good migration governance within the framework of hybrid model. The rise 
of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve 
migrant-based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not just 
simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses. 
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations 
for the migrants of North African countries. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which 
people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity is likely to increase equal opportunity 
and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events and ethnic 
enclaves, maximise benefits and minimise negative effects, and enhance the humane of 
migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action 
among home, transit and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to 
facilitate the exchange of information, create ground for networking and ensure a 
communication platform. With a specific focus to migrants-civil society dialectic, hybridity 
will create social and competitive harmony and transform win-lose philosophy to ‘To love or 
to be loved’ philosophy and realise the feminisation of migration. 
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The role of the EU is to help Western Balkans and North African countries to keep up 
realising reforms in various areas. The Western Balkans and North African counties’ 
migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilisation and 
integration reforms, enlargement and neighbourhood policy and the Stabilisation Association 
Process. These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with 
eastern countries which have multi-dimentional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with 
Western Balkans and North African countries. Obviously, it can be claimed that partnership 
and solidarity with Western Balkans and North African countries have significant influences 
for attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration of Western Balkans within the 
EU and stabilisation of North African countries will be a driving force for the EU. With 
respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these countries are seen as potentials or 
opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or potential 
problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled 
labour migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled workers over next 
years (Weiner and Munz 1997; Martin 2003; Brady 2008; Davoudi, Wishardt and Strange 
2010). Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center and ASAN – are 
strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order to attract high 
skilled labour migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence of the EU 
member states’ national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common 
EU migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for 
solving migration issues in different alternatives. The involvement of non-state actors to 
hybrid model will support capacity building and active networking. In addition, a more 
civilised European society can enhance the moral responsibility towards dealing with 
migration issues. A more civilised European society will have willingness to open its borders 
to non-EU citizens (i.e. the citizens of Western Balkan and North African countries). 
Increasing moral values and judgements will make the real beneficiaries of the free 
movement of persons and workers all Europeans. Only if the migration policies and 
regulations reformulate with taking into consideration moral values and judgements, they can 
be more effective and global. 
Eventually, moralisation of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and 
hybrid forms can provide definite solutions in various aspects and controlling migration can 
transform socially the migration process in favour of migrants and society as well as state and 
non-state actors. 
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Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of migration is an utopia (or absolut spirit), 
however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies with minimum problems 
is not only rational but also real. 
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Annex 
Table A1: Total Visa statistics 2009 
Schengen States Schengen visas 
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas) 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
AT 285.196 5,23% 27.169 
BE 165.474 17,38% 24.588 
CH 351.578 8,70% 37.975 
CZ 440.360 3,74% 17.109 
DE 1.491.784 9,06% 139.640 
DK 77.142 5,40% 1.037 
EE 93.464 2,49% 399 
EL 598.883 4,68% 40.686 
ES 748.466 9,97% 135.568 
FI 783.340 1,58% - 
FR 1.415.886 12,35% 167.108 
HU 272.972 4,14% 8.530 
IS 779 4,18% 88 
IT 1.053.354 5,02% 155.286 
LT 236.299 1,77% 2.824 
LU 5.364 2,38% 27 
LV 118.436 3,48% 1.450 
MT 28.915 9,31% 4.168 
NL 313.534 7,37% 9.032 
NO 105.430 0,75% 16.502 
PL 579.424 3,29% 210.292 
PT 107.224 6,87% 15.800 
SE 172.595 7,62% 527 
SI 97.690 4,19% 391 
SK 62.287 3,78% 1.982 
UE Member States not 
applying yet fully the 
Schengen acquis 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
BG 595.914 1,05% 8.575 
CY 113.205 2,63% - 
RO 175.956 3,24% 12.831 
Totals Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
Sub-total Schengen 9.605.876 7,11% 1.018.178 
Sub-total non Schengen 885.075 1,70% 21.406 
Total 10.490.951 6,68% 1.039.584 
Source: European Commission 2011: 21 
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Table A2: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 
Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
 
The Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database) 
Albania            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
17.45868 
          
Net migration -270245 
    
-72243 
    
-47889 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
523 292 17 26 51 56 56 77 65 70 76 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
6802 7626 10761 10385 10478 12722 14079 15340 15006 15711 14772 
International migrant stock, 
total 
76695 
    
82668 
    
89106 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.496699 
    
2.631231 
    
2.780839651 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 89106 
Host Country: 1438451 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France 
1438.3 thousands, 45.4% of 
total population (2.83 
million, Instat 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1% 
89.1 thousands, 2.8% of 
total population 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
20.30026 
          
Net migration 281795 
    
61825 
    
-10000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
38152 32745 28022 22517 22215 10568 10318 7367 7257 7132 7016 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
474981 447321 406326 300006 228815 109930 199946 78273 74366 70018 63004 
International migrant stock, 
total 
96001 
    
35141 
    
27780 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.599048 
    
0.92941 
    
0.73880051 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 27780 
Host Country: 1460639 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy 
1461.0 thousands, 
38.9% of total population 
(3.8 million, 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3% 
27.8 thousands, 0.7% of 
total population 
Kosovo** 
**World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host 
country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 
2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 2009. 
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
29.38359           
Net migration -9000     -4000     2000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
9050 4363 2816 193 1004 1274 1240 1235 1672 1542 1398 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
2176 12197 8072 5982 5104 8600 7940 8077 7521 7926 7889 
International migrant stock, 
total 
125665     120288     129701 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
6.254819     5.901941     6.294444771 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 129701  
Host Country: 447137  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France 
447.1 thousand, 21.9% of 
total population (2 million, 
2010) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3% 
129.7 thousands, 6.3% 
of total population 
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Montenegro 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -32450 
    
-20632 
    
-2508 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum       
6926 8528 24741 24019 16364 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin       
135 557 1283 2582 3246 
International migrant stock, 
total      
54583 
    
42509 
International migrant stock (% 
of population)      
8.709048 
    
6.731539692 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population 
censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 42509 
Host Country: 36 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary 0.0 thousands 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5% 
42.5 thousands, 6.8% of 
total population (0.63 
million, 2010) 
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -147889 
    
-338544 
    
0 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
484391 400304 354402 291403 276683 148264 98997 97995 96739 86351 73608 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
146748 144231 323335 296632 237032 189989 174027 
16564
3 
18593
5 
19562
6 
183289 
International migrant stock, 
total 
856763 
    
674612 
    
525388 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
11.39866 
    
9.066428 
    
7.204424665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 525388  
Host Country: 130844  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark 
196.0 thousands, 2.0% of 
total population (7.3 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7% 
525.4 thousands, 5.3% 
of total population 
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Albania 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 598 699 734 889 1161 1290 1359 1468 1495 1317 1285 
Workers' remittances 531 615 643 778 1028 1161 1176 1305 1226 1090 
 
Compensation of employees 67 84 90 111 132 129 184 163 270 227 
 
Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows    4 5 7 27 10 16 10  
Workers' remittances    0 0  
0 
    
Compensation of employees    4 5 7 27 10 16 9  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US$3.8 bn in 2008. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1595 1521 1526 1749 2072 2043 2157 2700 2735 2167 2228 
Workers' remittances 950 919 956 1143 1474 1467 1589 1947 1899 1432  
Compensation of employees 631 581 540 595 579 570 560 739 828 643  
Migrants' transfer 26 25 30 11 19 5 8 13 8 6  
Outward remittance flows 2 11 14 20 62 40 55 65 70 61  
Workers' remittances 
 
5 7 10 49 28 41 50 53 46  
Compensation of employees 2 6 7 11 13 12 14 15 17 15  
Migrants' transfer           
 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$6.8 bn in 2008. 
Kosovo** Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.  
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Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 81 73 106 174 213 227 267 345 407 401 414 
Workers' remittances 80 68 92 146 161 169 198 239 266 260  
Compensation of employees 0 5 14 28 52 57 69 106 140 121  
Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows 14 21 23 16 16 16 18 25 33 26  
Workers' remittances 14 21 23 15 15 14 16 22 28 22  
Compensation of employees 
  
1 1 1 2 2 3 5 4  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$5.0 bn in 2008. 
Montenegro Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.  
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1132* 1698* 2089* 2661 4129 4650 4703 5377 5538 5406 558 
Workers' remittances    
    
2948 2913 3755  
Compensation of employees    
    
148 191 184  
Migrants' transfer    
    
2 2 3  
Outward remittance flows    
    
114 138 91  
Workers' remittances    
    
95 114 70  
Compensation of employees    
    
17 23 20  
Migrants' transfer    
    
2 1 1  
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$14.8 bn in 2008. 
*Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011 
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Table A3: Comparison of the EU IPA Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries 
 
Albania 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 56.52 38.66 15% 
Public Administration Reform 43.15 38.66 15% 
Transport 49.06 51.55 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 80.12 51.55 20% 
Social Development 13.40 25.77 10% 
Rural Development/Agriculture 17.20 51.55 20% 
TOTAL 259.45 257.74 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 84.30 85.99 87.45 
Cross-border Cooperation 10.13 10.28 10.67 
TOTAL 94.43 96.27 98.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 38.64 55.00 17.5 % 
Public Administration Reform 51.55 40.00 12.7 % 
Private Sector Development 28.10 50.00 15.9 % 
Transport 22.30 35.00 11.1 % 
Environment and Climate Change 72.70 54.22 17.3 % 
Social Development 46.75 40.00 12.7 % 
Acquis related and other Actions 52.54 40.00 12.7 % 
TOTAL 312.58 314.22 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 102.68 104.67 106.87 
Cross-border Cooperation 4.75 4.80 4.94 
TOTAL 107.43 109.47 111.81 
Kosovo 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 78.50 (18.46%) 61.09 30 % 
Private Sector Development 192.93 (45.38 %) 97.75 48 % 
Public Administration Reform 106.22 (24.98%) 20.35 10 % 
Other 47.55 (11.18%) 24.42 12 % 
TOTAL 425.20 203.61 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 65.83 67.07 70.71 
Cross-border Cooperation 2.87 2.93 2.99 
TOTAL 68.70 70.00 73.70 
Macedonia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Public Administration Reform 28.00 21.33 7 % 
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights 44.00 24.38 8 % 
Private Sector Development 45.50 45.71 15% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 46.40 67.04 22 % 
Transport 52.50 60.95 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 28.30 54.85 18% 
Social Development 37.30 30.47 10% 
TOTAL 282.00 304.76 100% 
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IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 28.80 28.20 27.94 
Cross-border Cooperation 5.12 5.18 5.24 
Regional Development 39.30 42.30 51.80 
Human Resources Development 8.80 10.38 11.20 
Rural Development 16.00 19.00 21.03 
TOTAL 98.02 105.07 117.21 
Montenegro 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 17.85 7.30 8% 
Public Administration 21.65 10.04 11% 
Environment and Climate Change 14.80 22.82 25% 
Transport 16.20 18.26 20% 
Social development 8.63 9.13 10% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 8.10 14.60 16% 
Ad hoc measures 8.11 9.13 10% 
TOTAL 106.54 91.28 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 29843599 21585429 49.05% 
Cross-border Cooperation 4310344 9257238 12.94% 
Regional Development 0 23200000 22.13% 
Social Development 0 5757077 5.49% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 0 10900000 10.40% 
TOTAL 34153943 70699744 100.00% 
Serbia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 42.00 75.00 12% 
Public Administration Reform 89.00 75.00 12% 
Social Development 96.00 75.00 12% 
Private Sector Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Transport 71.00 75.00 12% 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy 93.00 99.00 16% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities 120.00 75.00 12% 
TOTAL 579.00 624.00 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 190.00 194.00 203.00 
Cross-border Cooperation 12.00 12.00 12.00 
TOTAL 202.00 206.00 215.00 
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Table A4: Comparison of the North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 
Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
 
The North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database) 
Algeria            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 9,512722           
Net migration -140000     -140000     -140000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 169656 169422 169233 169033 169048 94101 94180 94137 94093 94137 94144 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 8034 8419 12091 11667 10691 12041 8353 10615 9060 8185 6689 
International migrant stock, 
total 250110     242446     242324 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,819124     0,737177     0,683215 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 242324  
Host Country: 1211118 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK 
1,211.1 thousands, 
3.4% of total population 
(34.9 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 45.2% 
242.3 thousands, 0.7% 
of total population 
Egypt 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
4,671608957           
Net migration -945704     -370780     -346922 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
6840 7230 80494 88749 90343 88946 88022 97556 97861 94406 95056 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
3953 4678 6442 5735 5376 6291 7613 6799 6780 6990 6913 
International migrant stock, 
total 
169149     246745     244714 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
0,25004132     0,33252602     0,301665127 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 244714 
Host Country: 3741055  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy 
3,739.1 thousands, 
4.4% of total population 
(83 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 46.6% 
244.7 thousands, 0.3% 
of total population 
Libya 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
4,315018           
Net migration -20300     -20300     -20300 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
11543 11664 11666 11897 12166 12166 2760 4098 6713 9005 7923 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
619 888 1455 1570 1720 1575 1573 1954 2084 2202 2309 
International migrant stock, 
total 
558770     617536     682482 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
10,68151     10,70307     10,7391 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 682482  
Host Country: 110080   
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: The UK, Germany and Italy 
110.1 thousands, 1.7% 
of total population (6.4 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 35.5% 
682.5 thousands, 10.4% 
of total population 
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Morocco 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 18,59199 
          Net migration -500000     -614000     -675000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 2105 2091 2127 2121 2121 219 503 786 766 773 792 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 392 363 1268 1291 1318 2920 4710 4039 3533 2286 2284 
International migrant stock, 
total 53124     51020     49098 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,184502     0,167871     0,153665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 49098  
Host Country: 3016631  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany 
3,016.6 thousands, 
9.3% of total population 
(32 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.7% 
49.1 thousands, 0.2% of 
total population 
Tunisia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 12,63446           
Net migration -55624     -80599     -20000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 436 97 102 99 90 87 93 101 94 92 89 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 1207 1368 2542 2563 2518 3129 2844 2507 2349 2260 2174 
International migrant stock, 
total 36221     34881     33591 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,378742     0,347801     0,318425 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 33591  
Host Country: 651737   
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Italy, Germany and Belgium 
651.6 thousands, 6.3% 
of total population 
(10.4 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.3% 
33.6 thousands, 0.3% of 
total population 
Comparison of the North African Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Algeria 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 790 670 1070 1750 2460 1950 2527 
(a) 
2906 2202 2059 2031 
Workers' remittances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Workers' remittances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer    
        
(a): 2.2% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.3 bn, total international reserves US$148.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$79.1 bn in 2008. 
Egypt 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 2852 2911 2893 2961 3341 5017 5330 
(a) 
7656 8694 7150 7681 
Workers' remittances 2852 2911 2893 2961 3341 5017 5330 7656 8694 7150 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 32 35 14 79 13 57 135 180 241 255 .. 
Workers' remittances 32 35 14 79 13 57 135 (b) 180 241 255 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$9.5 bn, net ODA received US$1.3 bn, total international reserves US$34.3 bn, exports of goods and services US$53.8 bn in 2008. 
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Libya 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 9 10 7 8 10 15 16 (a) 16 16 14 16 
Workers' remittances 6 5 3 3 5 7 6 .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees 3 5 4 5 5 8 10 .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 463 683 694 676 790 914 945 (b) 762 964 1,000 .. 
Workers' remittances 454 675 776 644 940 854 880 762 964 .. .. 
Compensation of employees 9 8 10 32 35 60 65 .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a):0.03% of GDP in 2006; (b): 1.9% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$4.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.1 bn, total international reserves US$96.3 bn, exports of goods and services US$62.8 bn in 2008. 
Morocco 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 2161 3261 2877 3614 4221 4590 5451 
(a) 
6730 6895 6271 6447 
Workers' remittances 2161 3261 2877 3614 4221 4589 5451 6730 6894 6271 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 0 .. .. .. .. 0 .. .. 1 .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 29 36 36 44 42 40 41 (b) 52 58 61 .. 
Workers' remittances 23 27 30 34 34 35 38 49 54 60 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 6 9 6 10 8 5 3 3 3 1 .. 
(a): 9.5% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.5 bn, net ODA received US$1.2 bn, total international reserves US$22.7 bn, exports of goods and services US$32.6 bn in 2008. 
Tunisia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 796 927 1071 1250 1431 1393 1510 1716 1977 1966 1960 
Workers' remittances 796 927 1071 1107 1268 1195 1304 1446 1725 1,727 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. 143 163 198 206 269 252 238 .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 27 24 20 17 13 16 16 15 16 13 .. 
Workers' remittances 21 21 13 11 7 7 7 7 6 .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. 7 6 8 10 8 10 .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 6 3 8 7 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$9.0 bn, exports of goods and services US$24.6 bn in 2008. 
Source: The World Bank 2008 and 2011 
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